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Abstract 
Child trafficking and child labor are two terms that tend to elicit vivid images of suffering and there are 
countless IGOs, NGOs, advocacy organizations, government programs, and pieces of legislation worldwide 
that aim to combat both. Using two small rural communities in India and in Togo as primary case studies, 
I argue that the definitions of these two terms, upon which international and national laws are predicated, 
are far too vague. They ignore the reality of independent child migrants by failing to account for children’s 
agency, however structurally constrained that agency might be. While child trafficking and child labor are 
frequently discussed, independent child migrants are not as well understood. This ethnographic and policy 
study examines the following question--what are the ways in which the dominant international discourse 
on child trafficking and child labor is incongruous with the real economic predicaments of independent 
child migrants? How might we rethink these normative understandings of childhood and labor in order to 
allow for the possibility of children’s agency and create policy that accordingly supports youth migratory 
endeavors, while still mitigating the negative aspects of the migration of independent child migrants? 
Though potentially controversial, I argue that the limited resources of the governments in countries where 
child migration is an issue would be more effective if allocated toward making this migration safer and its 
economic returns more reliable, rather than toward simple interdiction--a shift toward support in the 
place of mere protection. This strategy requires a new, culturally-appropriate conceptualization of 
“childhood” and of what economic activities are acceptable for children partake in. Both “developed” and 
“developing” countries can work toward this goal by conducting more research and supporting grassroots 
intervention initiatives that rely on local knowledge of the history, culture, and unique situation of each 
population in the place of historically problematic top-down “solutions.”  
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List of Abbreviations 
- CRC- Convention on the Rights of the Child 
- HDI- Human Development Index 
- HIPC- Highly-Indebted Poor Countries 
- IGO- Intergovernmental Organization 
- ILO- International Labor Organization 
- ILO-IPEC- International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor 
- IMF- International Monetary Fund 
- MGNREGA- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
- NGO- Non-governmental Organization 
- SAPs- Structural Adjustment Policies 
- TIP- Trafficking in Persons 
- TVPA- Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act 
- UN- United Nations 
- UNDP- United Nations Development Program 
- UNFPA-  United Nations Population Fund 
- UNICEF- United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
- UNODC- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
- USAID- U.S. Agency for International Development 
- WFCLC- Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 
List of Definitions 
- Agency- The capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. 
- Child- any person below the age of 18  
o Note: This standard is questioned, deconstructed, and put into cultural context in the 
paper. 
- Circular migration- Internal or international migration punctuated by sporadic or regular return 
trips to the migrant’s home for a varying length of time. Migrant does not stay home or at 
destination permanently. Migrant may or may not migrate to the same location each time he or 
she leaves home.  
- (Independent) migrant child- a child who may or may not be in conditions that would be 
considered exploitative, but has migrated out of own volition. 
o Note: “Independent child migrant” and simply “child migrant” are used interchangeably 
in the paper. 
- Internal migration- Regional or inter-state migration. Migrant does not cross national borders.  
- International migration- Migrant crosses national borders.  
- Pro-child study- A type of study that takes into account children’s agency and actively involves 
children in the research process, seeking their opinions and perspectives directly rather than 
through inference.  
- Repatriation- The act of returning a migrant to his or her place of origin or citizenship.  
o Note: This term is employed in academic literature to refer to both a migrant who has 
been ejected by the immigration authorities of a country he or she has crossed into 
illegally and also to refer simply to a migrant who has left home, been apprehended, 
and been returned home.   
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- Trafficked child- a child who has migrated out of serious deception or against his or her will for 
the purpose of unambiguous exploitation.  
o Note: The officially accepted definition is articulated in the Palermo Protocol and will be 
discussed in section 1.1 of the paper. 
-  (Young) Youth- any person between the ages of 15 and 25. 
o Note: This term has been used by academics to refer to a demographic often thought of 
as “young adults.” In some cases I spoke to migrants who were aged beyond 18, but 
were still considered “young” or as “youth” by members of their community. 
 
A Note on Confidentiality and Identity Protection 
The names of every individual mentioned in the body of this paper were changed for the 
protection of my interview subjects. The names of the villages I conducted research in, 
surrounding villages and, in the case of India, block and panchayat names were also changed. 
The pictures used along with the migrant profiles in Chapter 2 were taken with the subject’s 
consent. 
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Foreword 
 
When I first went into the field in 2012, I thought I was going to study child trafficking in 
Togo. I, like most Westerners who have been highly exposed to images of poverty and child 
rights abuses, thought of this phenomenon as unambiguously terrible and believed it should be 
stopped at all costs. However, the responsibility to truthfully represent the experiences of my 
interviewees necessitated the exploration of a different side of this dominant narrative, one in 
which children migrate of their own volition and live out both good and bad outcomes. As I will 
discuss further in the paper, this is a highly complex and morally charged issue that has been 
difficult for me to negotiate and articulate. By focusing on independent child migrants, I in no 
way wish to de-emphasize or belittle the truly horrible reality of children who are victims of 
crimes such as trafficking and forced labor. Instead I seek to increase the visibility of another 
group of migrants that is often miscategorized or overlooked, and to complicate the prevailing 
understanding of the issues surrounding child trafficking and child labor.  
This is a hybrid thesis written for both the department of Cultural Anthropology and the 
department of Public Policy at Duke University. Although they are decidedly different 
disciplines, I find that pairing the two can be highly productive for two reasons. First, because 
effective policy cannot be made without a true understanding of the people it affects and 
second, because although anthropology complicates phenomena under scrutiny and 
necessitates a nuanced, culturally-relevant view of these issues, it does not typically venture to 
offer concrete solutions. I see this project as an attempt to bridge the two—entreating 
policymakers to consider the anthropological side of independent child migration and to 
explore whether policy, when well-informed by ethnographic data, could be used to ameliorate 
some of the unfavorable situations these children do face. 
  
Maria C. Romano 
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Introduction 
 Sitting in the courtyard of my homestead in a small rural village in northern Togo, I asked 
François and Jacob, two young men who lived next door with my host mother’s mother-in-law, 
what their plans for the summer were now that they were finished with their final exams1. They 
looked at each other and grinned. Jacob answered that they were preparing to leave the village 
soon to cultivate on farms in Benin (about a day’s journey away) for a month in order to earn 
money for next year’s school fees2. François, now 20 years old, had migrated for work several 
times before, starting at just 16 years old, and Jacob, now 17, was faisant l’aventure3 for the 
first time. They weren’t yet sure of their departure date, but François, as the most experienced 
one, was going to lead the way and hire a car to sneak them and a few other boys in the village 
across the border. In his past experiences François had also been guided by a slightly older male 
whom he refers to as his “grand frère,” regardless of the lack of blood-relation4. François had 
worked for the same, relatively wealthy, family for the past three years and said that they were 
very nice and hospitable-- “They gave us boys a nice room to sleep in and cooked us good meals 
every day.” How much he was paid always depended on how much he worked, which depended 
in part on the rain. In general, however, he claimed he was paid well, an average of 20,000-
25,000 CFA ($42-$52 USD) per month because Togolese boys are known in the area for being 
good cultivators. “With any luck,” he said “I’ll make enough money to buy new clothes too!” 
 Six months later and 4,948 miles away I met a young migrant named Suresh in 
Gurutaraj, a small village in Rajasthan, India. Suresh was 22 years old at the time and had been 
migrating for work since age 16. Suresh decided to drop out of school after 9th grade because he 
had visited his sister recently in Mumbai, was attracted to the big city and thought he could 
make a lot of money there. Plus, he “was not really doing well in [his] studies anyway.” He 
worked in Mumbai for six or seven months making and selling street food with his brother-in-
law who employed him. Even though it was tiring, as he woke up to make the food at 4am and 
sold it out on the street until 10pm, he claimed he liked the work and felt satisfied with the 
money he made. Of the 3,000 rupees per month ($50 USD) that he made (which eventually rose 
to 4,500 rupees/month), Suresh kept about rs. 500 ($8 USD) for living expenses and sent the rest 
to his family with someone he knew who was leaving Mumbai for his village or thereabouts. If 
he couldn’t find anyone he would give it in an envelope to a bus driver he knew and trusted. 
Eventually Suresh tired of Mumbai, came home for a month or so, and left again, this time for 
Ahmedabad, a large city in Gujarat and a common destination for Rajasthani labor migrants. He 
found a job at a steel plant and now works as a contractor where he makes over 9,000 
rupees/month ($150 USD). Suresh says his family uses the money he sends them for food, 
clothing, medical expenses, farming equipment, and other expenditures. Since he acts primarily 
                                                          
1 Sections in italics shall henceforth indicate a story from the field.  
2 This practice of earning money over the summer to pay for the following year’s school fees is referred to as faire 
la rentrée. 
3 Faire l’aventure translates roughly to “to go on adventure.” This phrase is used in Togo to refer to the migration 
of youth in general, including migration in search of employment and for pleasure or adventure.   
4 Grande freres and grand soeurs are generally older youth or young adults in Togo who connait le chemin—or 
know the way—and will, in theory, show their charges the way like an older sibling would. This term, however 
much it indicates closeness, it not always a guarantee that that intermediary holds the younger migrant’s well-
being as his or her first priority. 
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as a supervisor at the steel plant, he says his job is “not too tiring” and he plans to continue 
working in Ahmedabad for several more years, returning home intermittently for festivals and 
to visit his family.  
 
Child trafficking and child labor are two terms that tend to elicit vivid images of suffering 
and outrage, especially in the West, and there are countless IGOs, NGOs, advocacy 
organizations, government programs, and pieces of legislation worldwide that aim to combat 
both. Using two small rural communities in India and in Togo as primary case studies, I argue 
that the definitions of these two terms, upon which international and national laws are 
predicated, are far too vague. They ignore the reality of independent child migrants such as 
François, Jacob, and Suresh by failing to account for children’s agency, however “thin”5 or 
structurally constrained that agency might be.  
Independent child migrants are minors who consensually leave their homes for some 
purpose. In this paper I will focus on independent child labor migrants, minors who leave their 
homes in search of employment, but they will be referred to henceforth as independent child 
migrants or simply child migrants. Many of the children and youth I spoke to throughout this 
three year project exhibited extraordinary agency and migrated voluntarily.  Because their 
home communities are experiencing an exodus of young laborers and because misfortune does 
befall some of them, national governments like those of Togo and India have attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to stop this migration through various interventions. 
When I first began working on this project, I was constantly asking myself whether 
youth migration was good or bad. If it were bad, I wondered whether or not it could be 
stopped, and if it were good, whether this could be substantiated with evidence that it was 
“helping to develop” home communities through remittances from labor. I have since 
concluded that youth migration can be good, bad, or both. It is much more complicated than 
this simple binary. Independent child migrants live in a variety of different social and economic 
circumstances and can live out different outcomes--some beneficial, some detrimental. The 
same applies to the question of whether child migration is beneficial to the home communities. 
Sometimes families greatly benefit from the remittances sent home by their children, and 
sometimes families or villages as a whole suffer more from the loss of labor that these youth 
contribute and the social value they add than they benefit from their remittances. As for 
whether the phenomenon can be stopped, the stories of resilience, determination, and bravery 
that I was fortunate enough to hear led me to believe that the movement of youth cannot be 
stopped as long as economic insecurity in their communities persists.  
Though potentially controversial, I argue that the limited resources of the governments 
in countries where child migration is an issue would be more effective if allocated toward 
making this migration safer and its economic returns more reliable, rather than toward simple 
interdiction--a shift toward support in the place of mere protection. This strategy requires a 
new, culturally-appropriate conceptualization of “childhood” and of what economic activities 
are acceptable for children partake in.  
                                                          
5 See discussion of “thin” agency in section 2.3. 
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Making youth migration safer is not, of course, a long-term solution. The ultimate goals 
of the international community, national governments, NGOs, and other relevant institutions 
should be economic growth at the macro-level and the expansion of sustainable employment 
opportunities for the communities in question, along with a revamping of rural education 
systems--for only under these conditions will migrating for employment cease to be so 
attractive to young people. Ultimately, this ethnographic and policy study examines the 
following question--what are the ways in which the dominant international discourse on child 
trafficking and child labor is incongruous with the real economic predicaments of independent 
child migrants? How might we rethink these normative understandings of childhood and labor 
in order to allow for the possibility of children’s agency and create policy that accordingly 
supports youth migratory endeavors, while still mitigating the negative aspects of the migration 
of independent child migrants?  
While child trafficking and child labor are frequently discussed, independent child 
migrants are not as well understood.  The number of these young migrants varies from country 
to country and community to community, but the reasons these children give for migrating are 
largely the same—poverty, occasionally the death or serious illness of a parent and the 
responsibility of earning for one’s family, academic shortcomings or the need to earn school 
fees, low agricultural productivity and scarce alternative local employment, insufficient public 
investment in essential economic and social services, the desire for adventure, or simply the 
desire to earn money for themselves. Many of these young migrants take active roles in regards 
to their migratory decisions and take pride in contributing to their families’ livelihoods. Due to 
certain normative conceptions of childhood, this agency is often overlooked, leading to gaps in 
research by migration experts, gaps in services provided to these migrants by non-
governmental organizations, and gaps in government policy.  
For example, although François and Jacob are close in age and good friends, the fact 
that the boys were paid unfairly low wages, that their work could be considered exploitative, 
and that Jacob and some of the other boys were under 18 years old at the time would mean 
that François could be considered a trafficker of children by most laws. The minors would be 
considered victims of trafficking even though they fully consented to their transportation and 
subsequent employment.  Though Suresh was clearly working unfairly long hours for little pay, 
even when employed by a relative, it was his decision to leave the village in search of 
employment and in under a year he acquired a job that he is much happier with, one that helps 
him provide for his family, and even though $150 USD/month still seems like a terribly low sum 
of money, it is over the minimum wage for even “highly skilled” workers in Rajasthan 
(Department of Labour and Employment, 2014). These are common stories among 
independent child migrants, even if they have differing outcomes, different levels of “success” 
or “failure.”  
In this paper I have included ethnographic data from months of fieldwork in Togo and in 
India, an exploration of relevant international and national policy, and an analysis of primary 
documents, predominantly U.S. Embassy cables, that detail the State Department’s anti-TIP 
efforts around the world. I also consulted studies conducted by child rights advocacy 
organizations as well as the growing body of academic research on independent child migrants 
as a population separate from victims of trafficking or child laborers. There are few working 
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models of policies that are inclusive of independent child migrants and both their capacity for 
agency as well as their vulnerabilities. Even so, both “developed” and “developing” countries 
can work toward this goal by conducting more pro-child6 research (both in sending regions and 
at destination) and supporting grassroots intervention initiatives that rely on local knowledge of 
the history, culture, and unique situation of each population in the place of historically 
problematic top-down “solutions.”  
 
Methods: 
 
Togo 
In the two months I lived in northern Togo, from May 2012 to July 2012, I completed 28 
qualitative interviews with migrant youth and their parents, community members including 
neighbors of mine, school teachers, religious leaders, village chiefs, NGO workers, and 
government officials. I set up official interviews through my translator, an integral member of 
the village community, but I listened to anyone who wanted to talk with me about youth 
migration. My translator and I made a conscious effort to choose both men and women of all 
ages. This came to include young people who had previously migrated, young people who had 
never migrated but who had friends or siblings who had, and older people with children who 
may or may not have left the village in search of employment. These interviews typically lasted 
about an hour and were conducted in French, Kabiyè7, or sometimes a mix of both. My 
questions were largely open-ended as I wanted to gain an understanding of the community’s 
experience with and perception of youth migration. When interviewing young Kabre or their 
parents, my goal was to roughly map out the migration history of the household by asking who 
in the family had migrated and to where, for what kind of work, at what age, for how long, 
what their experience was like, and so on.  
Slowly I started to learn more and more about the different pathways available to young 
people aspiring to earn money for themselves and their families, what the process of leaving 
the village was like, the different type of work young men and women could expect at 
destination, the differences between working in southern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria (the most 
common destinations), and most importantly how the community was responding to this 
phenomenon. While all of these things gave me insight into the nature of youth migration, the 
scope was still unclear. To determine how many young people were leaving the village each 
year and how many of those were travelling abroad to Benin, Nigeria, and potentially other 
neighboring countries, I began to gather quantitative data.  
I started by gaining access to the Centre Médico-Social’s (Kpagouda’s hospital) census 
records from 2011. These legers were separated into three, corresponding to each of 
Kpagouda’s three “sectors,8” so I counted out how many people in each sector fell into my 
                                                          
6 See list of definitions 
7 A Gur language spoken primarily in northern Togo (Simons 2014). 
8 Kpagouda has three sectors consisting of the area up on the “mountain,” called Kpagouda Montagne or 
Kpagouda Pough, the area in the plain north of the main road called Kpagouda Pleine Nord, and the area in the 
plain south of the main road called Kpagouda Pleine Sud. This was the current method of dividing the village as 
explained to me by the head of the village hospital. 
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target population of people from nine-25 years old. This age range was one that, based on 
information gathered from my qualitative interviews, represented the ages of young people 
who were the most likely to migrate away from the village. According to the 2011-2012 village 
census, there were 767 individuals who fell into this range. 
I then approached the question of scope in three different ways. First I interviewed all 
six chefs du quartier9 and asked each of them how many young people had left his (they were 
all male) quartier in the last year and in the last five years, whether they were mostly male or 
female, the migrants’ average age, the most common destination, and the most cited reason 
for leaving the village. This method proved very subject to the chief’s mood and memory and 
did not appear to be too statistically accurate.  
The second method was to interview the principals or directeurs of the three village 
primary schools and the village complexe10 and ask them how many students dropped out of 
school this past year and in the last five years, how many were boys versus girls, which of those 
dropouts was directly linked to migratory activity, and of those, where the migrant went.  
The final method was to go “door-to-door” to a random sample (about 10%) of 
households in each sector of the village11 and interview the heads of house about the migration 
history of their families by asking them how many people in their household migrated between 
the ages of nine-25 in the last year and in the last five years, where they went, how old they 
were when they first left, and why they decided to leave the village. This last method was the 
most painstaking, but it resulted in what seemed to be the most accurate and detailed 
information of the three strategies. Though the results could be further improved by a larger 
sample size, I learned that roughly 35% of young people ages nine-25 leave Kpagouda in search 
of employment every year, that Benin is the most popular destination, and that the primary 
motivations are to earn money for one’s family and to earn one’s school fees for the upcoming 
year. 
When I returned to Togo a year and a half later in December 2013, I worked with the 
same translator and returned to the same village, but focused only on qualitative research and 
sought out specific individuals I wanted to get more information from or individuals that I had 
not had the chance to meet during my previous trip. This time of year coincides with the time 
most migrants to Nigeria return home after a year or more of labor and I was fortunate enough 
to be able to interview a few of those youths during my short return trip.  
 
India 
I began working in India as part of a study abroad program from January to March 2013. 
I focused my class fieldwork specifically on independent child migration in an attempt to collect 
data to compare to that of Togo. First I was partnered and began working with an NGO called 
Aajeevika Bureau, an NGO based in Udaipur that combines “direct service delivery, advocacy, 
research, and technical support in advancement of its work on issues of migrant workers” 
("Vision, Mission and Approach").  I completed my research in a village about an hour outside of 
                                                          
9 Kpagouda had previously been divided into six quartiers, each of which had a leader. As these leaders had 
intimate knowledge of the families in their quartiers, I sought them out to ask them about how many young people 
had been leaving their quartier of the village for work. 
10 Kpagouda’s combination middle and high school.  
11 The number of households in each sector also came from the 2011 village census.  
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Udaipur called Gurutaraj and in order to prepare I acquired data from the Aajeevika Bureau’s 
most recent survey of the Malwara panchayat12 and studied its migratory situation in addition 
to that of Kherlumbar Block13 as a whole.  
Upon arrival at Gurutaraj, my research village within Malwara panchayat, I got to know 
its layout through a process of social mapping-- a strategy by which you ask multiple people in a 
community, young and old, men and women, to help you “map out” the village, highlighting the 
location of things like schools, hospitals and other public infrastructure, water sources, different 
religious or ethnic groups, the homes of “important” people, main roads, market places, and 
whatever else they deem important. The objective is to get a sense for how life works in the 
community, how and where people interact, who has access to which resources, and so on. I 
continued by talking to as many people as possible about life in the village--who lives where, 
predominant castes, what people do for a living, where people generally migrate to, the quality 
of education, and a host of other things. I also went to the village’s school and got to know the 
teachers and the principal. Eventually (after a few visits), I asked them about dropout rates, 
especially those dropouts that resulted in the employment-seeking migration of the student.  
Next I went throughout the main village of Gurutaraj, its two hamlets, Tandil and 
Gadatalayi, and then to a neighboring village called Gundapur asking people to share with me 
the names of individuals they knew who had first migrated out of the state of Rajasthan before 
the age of 18.  I asked people to limit their suggestions to migrants who had traveled outside 
the state because many people were involved in “up-down” migration—daily movement to 
more urban locations like Kherlumbar and Udaipur and back—but I wanted to examine semi-
permanent migration which takes a lot more forethought, is less volatile in terms of changing 
occupations from day to day, and would allow for interesting questions of the child’s agency. I 
asked people to limit their suggestions to migrants who had migrated outside the state before 
the age of 18 in order to accurately employ the term independent child migrant and to establish 
at least a limited amount of uniformity across my interview subjects. After this process, I 
triangulated this information as I went along by asking people to add to, remove, or change 
names on the list.  
I went back to the school and visited the 7/8th standard class and 9th/10th standard 
class, explained the work that I was doing and why, and asked the students if they had any 
friends or siblings who were working out of the state. This yielded a few very helpful leads as 
these are the grades that see the most dropouts.  
After establishing a presence in the village and after I felt as if people had some 
semblance of trust in the fact that I am a student and not an undercover government worker, I 
went searching for these migrants and conducted semi-structured interviews with them. I 
spoke to the migrant himself if he was currently in the village or with his immediate family 
members if he was not. I was able to create the profiles of 18 people who had migrated at or 
before the age of 18. In 7 of the interviews I was able to speak to the migrant himself. In 11 I 
spoke to immediate relatives. Each of my profiles was of a male as no one seemed to know of a 
single woman who had semi-permanently migrated out of the state for employment.  
I collected mostly qualitative information because I knew that I would only be in 
Gurutaraj for 11 days and that reliable survey data would take more time to collect. I did collect 
                                                          
12 A panchayat is a group of several villages 
13 A block is a  group of many panchayats 
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some quantitative data, however, which allowed me to begin to explore the correlation 
between indicators, but my analysis is limited by my small sample size.  
I collected data for each migrant on sex, caste, current age, age when he or she first 
migrated out of the state, their highest completed grade level, who made the decision for them 
to migrate, reasons for migrating, whether their parents knew they would leave, their parents’ 
occupation and education levels, the migrant’s birth order and number of siblings, and what 
their hopes were for the future. For each job they held outside the state I asked them to tell me 
the city they were in, what the occupation was, the amount of time they spend at that job, 
whether they had guaranteed employment there before migrating, how often they returned 
home, whether they had an intermediary, their salary, transportation and living expenses, 
remittances (amount and frequency), the methods they employed to transfer their remittances, 
what their families used their remittances for, job conditions overall, whether they acquired 
any skills, and whether there was opportunity for advancement.  
When I returned to India from June to August in the summer of 2013, I worked for 
Aajeevika Bureau full-time as an intern. One of several projects I was assigned was a social and 
economic impact assessment of the Bureau’s skills training institute called STEP Academy. By 
working at STEP Academy I was able to interview many of the young trainees who had been 
labor migrants before coming to the Institute, and when I went out to interview past trainees 
some of the Bureau’s staff was gracious enough to translate for me in interviews with child 
migrants we met in the area. These qualitative interviews were conducted in much the same 
fashion as those I had done previously in January 2013.  
 
Field Site Descriptions: 
 
Togo 
Kpagouda is a village that consists of just over 3,000 people. The majority belong to the 
Kabre ethnic group, but there is an incredible amount of religious diversity—with Evangelical 
Christians, Croix Blanche14, Catholics, and Muslims among them. Most people in the village are 
subsistence farmers, though some supplement this with income from working trades that they 
completed apprenticeships in such as tailoring and carpentry. Sometimes, however, this is 
simply not enough for some families that grow too large, that experience the death of a parent, 
that incur medical expenses, or encounter other misfortunes. Sometimes, people are forced to 
leave the village to find employment and support the family or simply out of a sense of 
adventure, as is the case with many young people. 
Labor migration is not a new phenomenon in Togo, for it has its roots in the country’s 
colonial history. One tentative conclusion from my first trip to Togo, however, is that the 
destinations of young migrants appear to be shifting from internal migration (from northern to 
southern Togo) to regional international migration, into Benin and Nigeria. This shift has led to 
many societal changes and has brought the question of child labor and child trafficking 
increasingly to the forefront of debate at the village, regional, and national levels.  
Sustained migration patterns in Togo began during the colonial period, as early as 1910, 
when the Germans discovered that cash crops could not be produced easily in the more arid 
                                                          
14 Described to me by members of the village as a religious sect that is equal parts animist and Christian. 
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north. Thus, colonials essentially turned the northern territories into a labor reserve, recruiting 
groups like the Kabre as workers to build the colony’s roads in the south and to work in the 
mines located there (Piot 1999, 40). Young Kabre men, often ten or twenty from each village, 
were transported to southern Togo where they would work for short stretches of time before 
returning to their home villages. By the mid-1930s, Kabre began to move into these zones in 
the south by their own volition, establishing scores of satellite communities to those of the 
North. Today more than 200,000 Kabre are currently living and farming in this region (ibid.). 
Despite having moved south, these colonial-era Kabre migrants remained “intimately 
tied” to their ancestral villages in the north, periodically returning to sacrifice to spirits and 
ancestors, to attend funerals, and to initiate their children (Piot 1999). The return north of 
southerners is often fraught with tension--with southerners parading their newfound wealth 
before jealous northerners while northerners assert their ritual authority over their wealthier 
“children” in the south. Despite this traditional authority, the flashy new items displayed by the 
southerners—radios, clothes, bicycles, and occasionally cars-- result in the inescapable allure of 
wealth for northern Kabre. 
Any kind of technology is desired and is a symbol of prestige. People notice whether your 
Nokia cell phone is in color or not, whether it plays music or not, and which games it has. One of 
the older boys living in the homestead next door to mine was fascinated with the laptop and 
solar panel I had brought from the States. He would help me set it up each morning and 
periodically check to see that all the connections were working. I once witnessed him taking 
apart a cell phone and charger because it wasn’t working, bite and twist the frayed wires, 
connect them to the battery, and charge it in no time. This same young man would then 
promptly leave all his wires, pick up his hoe, and go cultivate an entire ¼ of a hectare with it. 
Such dichotomies are just a part of daily life here. Another member of my host family was as 
comfortable using his machete as he was playing with my iPod and kindle. It was as if he had 
been around touch-screen technology his whole life. After a day of cultivating in the traditional 
Kabre way, he’d suggest we go to the “movies” and see Avatar, Eragon, or his personal favorite, 
a badly dubbed Chinese Kung-Fu movie. The movies or “le video,” as they call it, is simply a 
bar/boutique outfitted with a generator, a 19” TV, and a DVD player that plays a constant 
stream of pirated DVDs from 7pm-2am. Every night on the weekends and when school is out it is 
bursting with young people from the village watching western and Chinese movies, ordering tea 
and bread, and socializing. For some, this is where plans are made to leave the village to work 
and make money elsewhere. The decision-making involved in migrating south for work typically 
included one’s family. It was explained to me that the planning being done at “le video” was 
much more secretive, indicative of plans to migrate internationally, outside of Togo and 
completely separate from former kinship connections and familial networks in the South.  
The effects of globalization are felt even here in this tiny rural village in a country as 
small and as underdeveloped15 as Togo. With an increasing number of internet cafés, or 
“cybers,” both in nearby towns like Kara and now in Kpagouda itself, young people are being 
exposed to the internet, to the wider world, and they crave to be a part of it. This may be a 
significant contributor to youth migration.  
                                                          
15 As of 2010, only 27.9% of the Togolese population had access to electricity and Togo’s HDI value for 2012 was 
0.459, in the “low human development category,” placing the country at 159 out of 187 countries and territories in 
the world. ("Access to Electricity" 2013; Malik 2013). 
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With the longstanding, cyclical pattern of north-south and south to north migration so 
engrained in Kabre society, the possibility of a prominent shift towards migration to Benin and 
Nigeria instead is unsettling to many of the older generation, exciting for the younger 
generations, and overall of enormous importance for investigation. In researching this 
phenomenon during my first trip to Togo, I wanted to better understand the nature and scale 
of this potential shift as well as its social and economic implications, especially for independent 
child migrants. 
Sweating and slightly out of breath from the soccer match he had just played in, the 18-
year-old sat on a log, accepted a swig of my bottled water and explained to me (in a way that 
suggested he believed the answer to be self-evident) why young people were leaving the 
country for work, rather than traveling South like before. “There’s no money in the South 
anymore,” he said. His two friends and teammates agreed, "Leaving Togo is better. One can 
make 60,000 CFA/month ($127 USD) in Benin but only around 30,000 CFA/month working in the 
South, which is really too little, even if you don’t work on weekends in the South like you do in 
Benin.” When asked about Nigeria, one replied that, “The work there is very hard, but one can 
return with a ‘moto’ to show his family and friends. One can even become a moto-taxi and earn 
more money once back in the village.” The youngest of the three boys said that while working in 
the South is generally safest because one usually works for family, working in Benin, and Nigeria 
especially, is simply more profitable and affords one more prestige-- “[when you migrate outside 
of Togo] you have seen more of the world and might even be able to speak another language! 
Others come to respect you.”  
Benin and Nigeria have become the main destinations for young migrant laborers from 
northern Togo. In fact, in my very first casual conversation about youth labor migration with 
young people in the Kpagouda, including neighbors of mine, they did not even mention 
southern Togo as a popular place to make money outside the village. Upon further research, 
the economic argument did make sense, as Togo has the lowest GDP per capita of the three 
countries at a mere $1,100 USD16, but it was still surprising to me, given what I thought I knew 
and understood about the importance of the relationship between northern and southern 
Togolese, that this pattern would shift significantly (Piot 1999, 40). My young informants had a 
lot to say about these “new” destinations and the differences between working in each.  
First they explained a pervasive stereotype about the kinds of young people who go to 
each place, saying that youth who “don’t do anything” (those who have dropped out of school) 
go to Nigeria, while “students” go to Benin. When I asked for clarification on the distinction, 
wondering Two young cultivators in Kpagouda shortly before they left to why that was so, they 
explained that Nigeria is further work in Benin for the summer away than Benin, and that the 
journey to Nigeria is longer, more arduous, and more expensive, typically requiring the help, 
knowledge, and connections of an intermediary, or waga, and these wagas typically only make 
contracts17 for a minimum nine months. As such, if a school-aged teen wants to make money in 
                                                          
16 CIA World Factbook, 2012 est. Benin’s GDP/capita was reported as $1,700 USD and Nigeria’s was $2,700 US. 
17 Agreements made with wagas are oral contracts and typically delineate how long a migrant will work for and 
what form his or her payment will take (be it a motorcycle, a sound system, tin for roofs, a certain amount of 
money, etc). As explained in this section, compensation for work in Nigeria, especially for boys, is typically in the 
15 
 
Nigeria, he or she has to have about a year to spend there and thus can no longer attend 
classes back home. On the other hand, my interviewees explained that one could travel to and 
work in Benin for as little as two weeks and come back. This flexibility is what makes Benin such 
a popular destination for students who want to faire la rentrée, which is typically done over 
their summer holidays. 
Wagas are typically responsible for the migrant’s transportation to the place where he 
or she will work, for securing that employment, and for collecting and transferring payment to 
the migrant from the employer when their contracted amount of time is up. Wagas can merely 
be good friends who “know the way” and who have been to Benin or Nigeria one or a few times 
before, or they can be recruiters, in a sense, on behalf of employers in Benin or Nigeria.  
As I was finishing up my interviews at the end of the two months, a trend concerning 
wagas became very clear to me. The more personally a migrant knew his or her waga, the less 
likely they were to be cheated or led into harm’s way. Those youth who were wooed, if you will, 
by an unfamiliar waga who came into Kpagouda with his motorcycle and nice clothes, met 
them at le video and told them he could help them get anything they wanted if they left in 
secret to work with him abroad, were typically those whose waga led them to exploitative 
employers and ended up disappearing and pocketing the rewards that they were due. It is not 
unheard of, for young men especially, to go a year or sometimes more working tirelessly for a 
waga and an employer, only to be told at the conclusion of his contract that there will be no 
payment. With no bargaining power, there is little a migrant can do in this situation other than 
find a way to return home empty-handed. Those youth who left for Benin and Nigeria with a 
friend who had been there before typically ended up working for employers who were known 
to be kind and fair and they usually had good experiences. 
Given all the uncertainty, the potential for exploitation, and risk of coming back empty-
handed, why do these young men and women continue to leave their village-- one of 
subsistence, but not extreme poverty-- to work in Benin and Nigeria? Obviously, each migrant 
has his or her own story, his or her own motivation for embarking on this particular journey 
(sometimes many times over), but there are a few very common rationalizations.  
The two reasons that I heard most often expressed by the migrants themselves were 
related to family and to education. Often a parent falls ill, and in a society where polygamy is 
waning, but still present, meaning each family has many mouths to feed, this results in the 
older children having to grow up prematurely and provide for their families. As there are very 
few employment opportunities for youth near the village, they are forced to travel abroad 
where there is rumored to be money waiting. Wagas who recruit young labor often target 
families in these dire situations, for they are hard-pressed to decline the promise of a job and a 
“quick” end to their financial insecurity.  
The second most common narrative was related to the inadequacies of the rural 
education system. Large classrooms and a lack of teachers makes for a tough learning 
environment for anyone, especially kids who do not have enough petrol to do their homework 
at night, who might not have enough to eat, or who must farm and do other laborious chores 
when they return from school each day. This leads many to fail their exams and after a while 
they get discouraged, or their parents decide it’s not worth their money to send that child to 
                                                          
form of things and not cash. These contracts are most typically associated with wagas who take one to Nigeria, not 
Benin, and last for nine months, one year, or two years. 
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school anymore (especially if it is a girl). In fact, school fees rose in 1998 and all students were 
suddenly responsible for buying their uniforms, shoes, notebooks, pens, and so on. Indeed, an 
interview with a schoolteacher revealed that secondary school students in Kpagouda must pay 
10,000 CFA/year ($21 USD) and roughly 5,000 CFA in addition to that for books and other 
supplies. Those children whose families cannot afford the fees must either migrate for a short 
time to earn next year’s fees, or ultimately drop out. Many older siblings end up migrating to 
support their younger siblings’ continued education through their remittances. A child who 
drops out of school might decide that he or she wants to do an apprenticeship to be a 
seamstress, carpenter, or a number of other things which can lead to a good future, but it can 
cost exorbitant amounts of money to finance this training which often lasts several years and is 
unpaid even though the youth is working for his or her instructor.  
 
India 
Unlike in Togo, the bulk of independent child migration in India is still internal rather 
than international. This makes sense if one considers not only how much larger it is than Togo, 
but also how diverse the regions within India are, not just in terms of people, but in terms of 
dominant industries and breadth of economic opportunities. Uneven economic growth and 
development between rural areas and urban centers in India has placed the spotlight on this 
substantial and growing incidence of internal migration, where research was previously focused 
on “brain drain” effect of the international migration of middle to upper-class youth. In 
December 2011, UNESCO and UNICEF held a National Workshop on Internal Migration and 
Human Development in India, which brought to light many of the issues facing internal 
migrants. Among these are a lack of access to government services such as subsidized 
healthcare, shelter, and food at destination, political disenfranchisement, and a lack of legal 
protection, especially concerning the payment of fair wages and the provision of safe working 
conditions.  
These challenges facing internal migrants are seen across many different economic 
sectors. Prior to arriving in Udaipur, I did a literature review specifically focused on the 
construction sector--the largest employer of migrant labor in India, with 40 million migrant 
construction workers estimated in 2008-- and learned through one report that in addition to 
many of the aforementioned issues, the construction sector employs vast numbers of laborers 
who are under the legal working age of 18 (Deshingkar and Akter 2009).  
In my first month in India I got the chance to explore this for myself during my “Urban 
inquiry” assignment for my Development and Poverty Reduction class. I visited several 
construction sites and met many young migrants including the two boys, 11 and 15 years old,. 
They had migrated from a peripheral village to Udaipur and were living in the city on their own 
in a room they rented. Several others I met were living on the construction site itself.  
Unfortunately, my co-researcher and I were not able to speak to them for very long as 
we did not want to create conflict between them and their supervisors, who know all too well 
that employing underage workers is illegal and are afraid of being reported. However, I still 
hoped to find out whether this phenomenon of independent child migration was truly as “rare” 
as I had been told. What kind of situation and decision-making process brought these two boys 
here? What kinds of situations take other young migrants to other urban centers? What is their 
motivation and what are their hopes for the future? For the next month I traveled back and 
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forth to a village in Malwara panchayat, about 80 km south of Udaipur city and a “sending 
region” for migrants, to explore these questions further. 
In this study I wanted to look specifically at internal migration for employment or in 
search of employment and as such, the rural to urban migration stream (which the census has 
found to be increasing) became my focus. This stream is also male-dominant, though there has 
been a growing trend in women’s associational migration --migration due to movement of 
parents or earning members—in addition to the short-term migration of women to nearby 
urban centers for labor, as is seen in the Kherlumbar block where I conducted the bulk of my 
field research. 
Kherlumbar block is part of the Malwara Panchayat, where 317 out of 780 households 
(40.64%) reported migrating members (Migration Profile 2008). All in all, out of the panchayats 
that were surveyed by Aajeevika in Kherlumbar Block, Malwara had one of the lowest numbers 
of households reporting migration, which shows how pervasive labor migration is in the area. 
Disaggregated data for Gurutaraj and other specific villages in Malwara were not available to 
me at the time of writing this report.  
Gurutaraj, the specific village I spent most of my time in, has about 300 households and 
is separated into Gurutaraj-Majawat (comprised of mostly Rajputs , 1 Brahman family, and a 
handful of Muslim families) and Gurutaraj-Tavran (comprised almost entirely of tribals from the 
Meena tribe, with 1-2 Rajput families). Gurutaraj also contains two hamlets, Gada and 
Gurutalayi, each of which have 80-100 households, which are also comprised entirely of 
Meenas, a more specific tribal group. Gurutaraj has very few government facilities, but it does 
have a school for grades 1-10 in addition to an anganwadi or daycare. Only one of its hamlets, 
Gada, has a primary school. Kagra, another smaller village 2 km away from Gurutaraj and 
predominantly made up of Meenas, also has a primary school. 
In terms of migration, migration outside the state from this area is not a recent 
phenomenon, but migrating for wage labor and unskilled work is. Seventy-eight percent of 
migrants migrate outside Rajasthan and of the 78%, 53% migrate to Ahmedabad. These 
migrants are comprised of mostly ST and OBC and do predominantly hotel and construction 
work. Forty-one percent migrate to Mumbai. These are mostly OBC, and mostly entrepreneurs, 
shops keepers or helpers, and hotel workers. Just over 4% migrate to Bangalore. These are 
mostly ST and work with stone fitting and polishing. Further, 36% of households report 
migration as the primary source of household income and 45% of families has at least one 
member migrating. The most popular occupations are hotel and construction work, providing a 
livelihood to almost 25% of total migrants each, followed by scrap work, driving, and shop-
keeping. Finally, migrating youth typically drop out of the formal education system around 8th 
to 10th standard. 
 
A Look Ahead 
In Chapter 1 I will introduce the dominant international policies that have a bearing on 
child migration and discuss how normative conceptualizations of “the child” and of “labor” 
have been very influential in how these are written, understood, and implemented. I will also 
highlight how U.S. and international anti-TIP agendas and the fear of the repercussions of non-
compliance have been instrumental in getting the aforementioned laws ratified by a majority of 
countries, even if they do not reflect local understandings of the issues involved. In Chapter 2 I 
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will explain how the high-profile visibility of egregious cases of child trafficking and child labor 
has dwarfed the scarce research that has been done on independent child migrants. I will then 
deconstruct the term “independent” and explore the question of child agency and its 
constraints, drawing from specific cases of child migrants in Togo and India. I will also position 
these cases against the international laws discussed in Chapter 1 and show how they reflect an 
inadequate understanding of the real lives of many child migrants. Finally, in Chapter 3, I will 
highlight common government, non-government, and local interventions and their limitations. I 
will then examine how policy and ethnography can be paired to produce more nuanced and 
effective policy, culminating in suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 1: International Policies and Normative 
Conceptualizations of Childhood 
 
1.1 International Policy environment 
To fully understand child migration and its complexities, it is crucial to first situate it 
within the international policy environment in which it exists. In this chapter I will introduce 
three widely ratified international conventions on children and their rights, child labor, and 
human trafficking, respectively, and show how they assume a universal understanding of 
childhood and labor while actually reflecting normative, Western perceptions of these 
concepts. I will then explain how influential forces like the U.S. Trafficking in Persons (TIP) have 
come to bear on countries’ decisions to nevertheless adopt these laws and how parallel 
pressures have affected the overall approaches and policy responses of non-governmental and 
other local organizations to the issues of child labor and child trafficking. Finally, I will comment 
on how certain child advocacy organizations, in response to funding politics and “compassion 
fatigue,” have adopted sensationalist language and highlighted the extreme or most “pitiable” 
cases and on what that has meant for independent child migrants. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
In 1989 the world turned its attention to the status of children everywhere with the 
advent of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The convention, 
combined with the increase in global communication which “brought daily reminders of 
children’s suffering around the world,” created a “sense of urgency” not just for international 
agencies and children’s rights groups, but in for scholars as well (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 
2007, 241). New policies and approaches to children’s lives, major humanitarian relief and 
increased philanthropy began to target problems specifically affecting children—everything 
from biological factors, such as disease, to social factors, such as poverty (ibid.). Attention to 
the global problems of children “raised the visibility of children and childhoods” (Bluebond-
Langner and Korbin 2007, 241). The emerging anthropology of children and childhoods “began 
to look at children as a microcosm of concerns facing contemporary societies and an 
increasingly global world” (242). This increasingly global world is one that saw a staggering 
increase in human migration, which would later bring human (and thus child) trafficking to the 
fore (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2006).  
Echoing the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basic premise of the CRC is 
that children—defined as all persons below the age of 18--are born with the fundamental 
freedoms and inherent rights of all human beings ("Guide to Non-discrimination and the CRC" 
2009). Among these are the right to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from 
harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural and social 
life” ("Convention on the Rights of the Child" 2003).  The CRC especially emphasizes that actions 
taken concerning children should keep their “best interests” as the primary concern 
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(Whitehead 2007). United Nations International Emergency Children's Fund (UNICEF), which is 
guided in its mission by the provisions and principles of the CRC, describes the convention as, 
“A universally agreed set of non-negotiable standards and obligations…they are minimum 
entitlements and freedoms that should be respected by all governments ("Convention on the 
Rights of the Child" 2014). Currently 193 countries have ratified the convention. These 193 
countries include every member of the United Nations except Somalia (which in November 
2013 announced that it would do so) and the United States (which has no current plans to ratify 
the CRC, citing unconstitutionality) ("Convention on the Rights of the Child" 2003). To be 
considered compliant, each government must also report back to the UN on the progress of 
children's rights in their country. As a result, many governments have enacted their own 
national legislation to ensure the protection and realization of the rights of children. 
The phrase “best interest of the child” is used over nine times in the CRC in seven 
separate articles without any further explanation as to what this stipulation should look like in 
the process of implementation. The majority of the time the phrase appears, the CRC reads 
simply, “The best interests of the child will be the basic concern” ("Convention on the Rights of 
the Child" 2003). What exactly is in the child’s “best interest” and how might it be determined? 
By whom? While the CRC, rather uniquely, “recognizes that children are holders of rights and 
capable actors in their own respect, it also sees childhood as a phase in which the girl or boy is 
still evolving physically, mentally and emotionally,” thus requiring special measures to protect 
and promote their development (Lansdown 2005). For a piece of legislation that is meant to 
secure the rights of children, the idea that the “best interest” of the child is something that 
adults are to determine means that it remains highly adult-centric. The CRC clearly operates 
under the assumption that though individuals under the age of 18 have the right to articulate 
their own interests, they are not typically able to, and since this is the case, it outlines the 
concepts adults should consider when they make decisions on their behalf.   
The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (WFCLC) 
The next significant piece of international legislation, drafted in 1999, was the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (WFCLC), or 
the “Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor.” This piece of legislation, which, like the CRC, defines a child as any 
person under the age of 18, is listed as one of ILO’s eight “Fundamental Conventions.” The 
WFCLC bans four categories of child labor that “no government should tolerate” (C182 - Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention). The first is “modern slavery, debt bondage, and similar 
practices, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.” The 
second is “sex work, including pornography and prostitution.” Third is “illicit activities-- in 
particular drug trafficking,” and the last is defined, quite broadly, as “any other work that by its 
nature is likely to harm the health, safety, and morals of children” (Dennis 1999, 944-946).  
The preamble of the WFCLC recognizes “that child labor is to a great extent caused by 
poverty and that the long-term solution lies in sustained economic growth leading to social 
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progress, in particular poverty alleviation and universal education…” (C182 - Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention). Given the number of times poverty and the inadequacy of education 
or lack of educational opportunities were cited as reasons for child labor migration in my 
fieldwork, it is heartening that policymakers were keeping this reality in mind. However, the 
actual body of the WFCLC is again too vague in revisiting the issues of poverty and education: 
Based on the subtitle of the Convention, “The Convention concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor,” one would expect it 
to address not just the treatment of child labor, but its prevention as well. There is room for 
analysis at the source of the phenomenon of child labor and child labor migration, but the 
WFCLC falls short. As previously mentioned, it lists many types of work and other economic 
activities that children should not be involved in and in letters b and c shown above Article 7 
offers many recommendations for what to do with children who are “rescued” from their 
1999 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention  
Article 7 
1. Each Member shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions giving effect to this Convention including the provision and application of penal sanctions or, as 
appropriate, other sanctions. 
2. Each Member shall, taking into account the importance of education in eliminating child 
labour, take effective and time-bound measures to: 
 (a) prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour; 
 (b) provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal of children from the worst 
forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation and social integration; 
 (c) ensure access to free basic education, and, wherever possible and appropriate, 
vocational training, for all children removed from the worst forms of child labour; 
 (d) identify and reach out to children at special risk; and 
 (e) take account of the special situation of girls. 
3. Each Member shall designate the competent authority responsible for the implementation of the provisions 
giving effect to this Convention. 
 
Box 1                                                                                                                                                                                      
Source:  C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
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employers. Even so, the only mention of prevention is in letter a where the WFCLC merely 
states that national governments should prevent the worst forms of child labor, but not how. 
Letters d and e are especially vague.  
Overall the WFCLC offers far too little support to national governments in the 
implementation of its lofty standards and almost completely disregards the idea of preventing 
child labor. Couple this lack of direction with the fact that many of the nations that are plagued 
with rampant child labor do not have the resources to address it even if they did have a 
promising plan of action, and it is no wonder the last 14 years have seen so little progress 
(Measures to Combat Trafficking 2006). Much of this ambiguity can be attributed to 
compromises that must be made in order to acquire a sufficient number of signatories, but it 
leaves the Convention with no “teeth,” if you will (Pupavac 2002). At most, countries will put 
energy and resources into raids of employers and repatriation of child laborers, but, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, this strategy is ineffective when it comes to child labor migrants.   
The Palermo Protocol 
Perhaps the most frequently cited piece of legislation pertaining to the human 
trafficking debate is the UN’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children, also known as the Palermo Protocol (though it is actually one 
of several Palermo Protocols). It was adopted by the General Assembly in 2000. Entering into 
force in 2003, the Protocol became the first international, legally-binding piece of legislation 
with an “explicit” and “agreed upon” definition of trafficking in persons (TIP). The purpose of a 
universal definition was to facilitate cooperation and consistency in the approaches of different 
national governments in combating TIP ("United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime” 2013). As of October 2013, 147 countries have ratified and signed the 
Protocol. Even so, according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the office 
responsible for implementing the Protocol, “very few criminals are being brought to justice and 
most victims are never identified or assisted” ("The Blue Heart Campaign” 2012). The wording 
of this “explicit” definition of trafficking is as follows: 
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The Palermo Protocol’s definition of TIP has been heavily criticised by a number of 
academics for being vague and affording the term “trafficking” enormous (and unhelpful) 
elasticity (Davidson 2011). Davidson O’Connell, a professor of sociology at the University of 
Nottingham says of the Protocol, “‘Trafficking’ is thus described as a process (recruitment, 
transportation and control) that can be organized in a variety of different ways, involve 
different types and degrees of compulsion (all of which are undefined – what kind of threats? 
How much deception? Which types of vulnerability?), and lead to a variety of very different 
outcomes” (Anderson and Davidson 2003). When read carefully, it becomes apparent that the 
entire definition hinges on the word “exploitation” which itself is not defined. What degree of 
exploitation? Could this simply be poor working conditions or unfair pay (realities of the 
informal economy in developing countries, even for adults)? If so, the more important question 
is, what if the child consents to the “exploitation”? 
Article 3 of the protocol makes it explicit that in the case of those under the age of 
eighteen the issue of consent is irrelevant if their movement is considered to be for the 
purposes of exploitation. Thorsen and Hashim in Child Migration in Africa maintain that “the 
implication is that those under the age of 18 are incapable of exercising meaningful choice, in 
the process inextricably linking the status of the ‘child’ with that of ‘victim’ or ‘potential victim’” 
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially 
Women and Children 
Article 3 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
 
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; 
 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph 
(a) have been used; 
 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of 
exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the 
means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;  
 
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age. 
Box 2                                                                                                                                                                                             
Source: "United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2013 
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(Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 17). Indeed, “the very possibility that children might be capable of 
exercising choice about whether or not to move is rejected in many perspectives, including in 
legal instruments like the Palermo Protocol” (ibid.). 
By this logic, a 17-year-old male from Rajasthan, India who asks his older brother to take 
him to Surat with him to work in the saree-cutting industry is a “trafficked child” if he happens 
to be paid unfairly or if other forms of “exploitation” (again, we do not know how severe the 
exploitation has to be) befall him at destination. Bad conditions are highly likely considering 
that they are unskilled laborers with little education and will only have access to informal sector 
jobs that lack regulation as far as salary and other securities18.  It does not matter that this 
young man consented to this relocation for employment. Further, his brother would be 
considered a “trafficker of children” and could be punished as such, even if none of the means 
from subparagraph (a) are employed. One can clearly see how independent child migrants can 
easily be mislabelled as “victims of trafficking.”   
Interestingly enough, however, if these two brothers had crossed national boundaries 
rather than state lines, they might be considered illegal immigrants and the older brother, a 
smuggler. In a separate section, the protocol distinguishes between smuggling and trafficking. 
Smuggling refers to the movement of individuals where the individual has consented, while 
trafficking involves the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud 
deception or other abuse of power (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 17). It should give us pause that 
merely changing the destination can transform a victim of trafficking to a criminal illegal 
immigrant. In one scenario, agency is overlooked and the “victim’s” voice is further silenced 
due to the irrelevance of consent. The solution might be “rescue” and repatriation, which 
would be an inconvenience to the child migrant as he would have lost money in transportation 
costs and would be back to square one without employment. In the next scenario, agency is 
criminalized (Ensor and Goździak 2010, 2), and the solution might be a prison sentence. In both 
scenarios, the child migrant is marginalized and this defeats the purpose of helping children in 
the first place. By interdicting this movement of youth under 18 years of age, we have made 
their (many argue, inevitable) labor migration more dangerous because they must evade 
detection by law enforcement agencies, and also less profitable. 
Overall, these and numerous other international statutes19 that provide the framework 
for the protection of children are not superfluous. In cases where children are kidnapped, 
                                                          
18 Child labor tends to be mostly in the informal sector, but this is especially true when there is high adult 
unemployment in the formal sector, as is the case in Mozambique. According to a 2003 study there, 50% of adults 
were unemployed in the formal sector and one-third of children between the ages of 10 and 14 were economically 
active, primarily in agricultural sectors including family farms. It is very rather rare for children to be used as 
laborers in the formal industrial sector (Embassy Maputo 2006, 06MAPUTO1324). 
19 Other instruments influencing the overall framework of protection for migrant children include, among others, 
The International Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and their Families; ILO Convention 143 on 
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) of 1975; the Hague Conventions, including the Convention of the 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption; the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness; and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.  
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abused, or exploited, there must be legal instruments with which to convict perpetrators and 
violators of children’s rights. However, as I have highlighted, these laws too vague to support 
most attempts at implementation. The normative (and Western) frameworks of labor and of 
childhood on which these laws are predicated have meant that they were formed without a 
complete picture of the reality of children at the local level, a reality that includes the possibility 
of independent child migrants, youth under the age of 18 that actively negotiate their economic 
options and decide to relocate for the purpose of employment.  
1.2 Prevailing Notions of the “Child” 
The success of these Conventions in securing ratification by a vast majority of the 
world’s nations does not mean that the leaders, much less the citizens, of these countries share 
a universal understanding of children’s rights, of trafficking, of what constitutes a “worst form” 
of child labor, or even what constitutes a “child”.  
 All of the main legal instruments that govern the topics of child labor and child 
trafficking at the international level employ a seemingly universal age of adulthood, also known 
as the “age of majority,” or one’s “legal age.” In the United States, this age is defined as “the 
age at which a person is recognized by law to be an adult, capable of managing his or her own 
affairs and responsible for any legal obligations created by his or her actions” (West's 
Encyclopedia of American Law 1998, 126). In most U.S. states, and in a majority of foreign 
countries (see Figure 1) the age of majority is 18, but it also varies to an extent depending on 
the nature of the activity in which the person is engaged—drinking, driving, voting, marriage, 
consensual sex, military involvement, and so on (ibid.).  
Figure 1 
Source: (Kinnear 2007) 
Worldwide age of Majority 
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Why eighteen? One might hypothesize that this standard stems from scientific evidence 
of cognitive development, or perhaps historical precedent. However, recent scientific evidence 
suggests that our brains do not finish developing until our mid-twenties and that perhaps 25 is 
“the new cut-off point of adulthood” (Wallis 2013). On the opposite end, according to Roman 
law established in A.D. 529, children were “freed from guardianship” when they reached 
puberty, which was defined for males as occurring at 14 years of age, and 12 years old for girls 
(Frier 2004, 23). As one might expect, “Roman Law influenced people within the Empire and the 
age of fourteen may have been generally accepted, as a result, as the age of maturity” (James 
1960, 25). By other accounts, in northern Europe, fifteen seems to have been the age of 
majority, relating to when the “pupil” had both the understanding and judgment to act and 
make decisions, particularly in regards to property law (25). The “childhood” of the nobles in 
France ended at seventeen “because they were then judged strong enough and sufficiently 
qualified for the culture of their lands and commerce” (22). In England the age of majority was 
fifteen until the Magna Carta in 1215, at which point it was raised to twenty-one; the raising of 
the age “has been attributed to various causes, including the increase in the weight of arms” 
(26).  
Thus, the age at which a child becomes an adult is not “universal,” but culturally and 
historically specific. After all, a person may be biologically an adult and behave as such, but still 
be treated as a child if they are under the legal age of majority in a certain legal jurisdiction. 
Conversely, one may legally be an adult but possess none of the maturity or responsibility that 
defines the character of an adult. Even though most countries in the world set the age of 
majority at 18, this varies from a low of 14 (Albania) to a high of 21 (Argentina, Namibia, 
Lesotho, Egypt, and others) (Kinnear 2007, 90-93). The fact that the age of majority officially 
varies by up to seven years “shows that this issue is not just about the age a child becomes 
competent to perform certain legal acts, but also about when a person is considered mature 
enough to be viewed as an adult according to the cultures of various countries” (Coomer and 
Hubbard 2009, 105). The following case of Namibia shows that this is also a socioeconomic 
issue—kids in economic hardship seem to have to grow up faster.  
Policy makers in Namibia, one of the first countries to ratify the CRC, had to think 
critically about what it meant to “harmonize” its laws of majority to coincide with Article 1 of 
the CRC. They reasoned that:  
The trend towards setting the age of majority at 18 is partly a result of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention does not absolutely 
require that State Parties lower ages of majority which are higher than 18. Even so, the 
Committee which monitors the Convention has encouraged countries to harmonize the 
definition of the child and has recently criticized several countries for having an age of 
majority which is different than 18. The main motivation for harmonizing the ages is 
apparently to ensure that children do not lose any of their special legal protections 
before they acquire complete adult rights” (Coomer and Hubbard 2009, 105-106).  
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Indeed, the Youth Social Policy and Development Division of the UN states that “Article 1 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines ‘children’ as persons up to the age 
of 18. This was intentional, as it was hoped that the Convention would provide protection and 
rights to as large an age-group as possible and because there was no similar United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Youth” (“Youth- FAQ").  
In considering lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18 to comply with the CRC, 
Namibian officials sought input from members of the public, including youth, service providers 
and other key stakeholders “to ensure that the law would be suitable for Namibia and feasible 
to implement in practice” (Coomer and Hubbard 2009,104). Many youth responded that they 
would not be able to handle the added responsibilities of adulthood until they were older 
anyway, so 21 was an acceptable measure, but the curious thing was that all of those 
respondents were university students from middle-class or upper-middle class families. One 16 
year old’s response reminded me more of the child migrants I interviewed in my fieldwork. She 
stated, “I think people should be permitted the right to work at any type of job they want at 16. 
My mom is a domestic worker. I have passed my first term [of Grade 12], but do not have any 
money for tertiary education. Imagine the crisis I’m in. I’ve looked for jobs everywhere to 
support my further education. But they have all turned me down because of my age” (Coomer 
and Hubbard 2009, 115). Children are born into different circumstances and policy should 
account for these differences. 
Historically children ceased to be children at younger ages. It should not be so surprising 
that a minor would be capable of earning a living, or consenting to relocating in order to do so 
below age 18. Further, different cultures have different coming-of-age traditions. In Jewish 
tradition, the transition to adulthood is celebrated at 13 years of age for boys and 12 years of 
age for girls, while in many parts of Latin America, girls become women at age 15 in an 
ceremony called a quinceñera, In India, according to Sudhir Kakar, an analyst in the field of 
cultural psychology, children enter the last “stage” of childhood, the kumara, at ages 5-7 and 
cease to be children at ages 8-12 (Kakar 1979, 28). The age cutoffs of each stage of childhood 
according to Kakar, are actually age ranges, allowing for different lived experiences and 
development among individuals.  
In Togo, in order to determine who is considered a child or non-adult, I asked many of 
my interviewees “who in Togolese culture as a whole, and in this village specifically is 
considered an adult?” Théo, the head of an NGO called Action Humanitaire pour les Enfants en 
Difficulté (AHED), which works to help underprivileged children in various ways gave a 
particularly interesting answer. He responded saying, “anyone who can put food on the table, 
anyone who has gone through ceremonial initiation20, anyone who is completing an 
apprenticeship, and anyone who is pregnant or has impregnated someone is considered grown, 
an adult.” This would indicate that in Togo, and perhaps in many developing countries, an adult 
                                                          
20 These initiations occur every 5 years, so young men and women might be of varying ages. Usually around 
puberty (about age 15) or slightly after 
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is not someone who has reached a certain age, but rather someone who has done adult-like 
things. His definition is active rather than passive, indicating that in many places, maturity is a 
process, not an achievement. Since child migration occurs in areas of high adult out-migration, 
migration itself is considered adult-like and can be thought of as a way to come of age or 
transition into adulthood (Ensor and Goździak 2010, 1). 
A universalized view of the child “based on Western assumptions about children’s best 
interests and a single standard of age (18 and under) is antithetical to most anthropological 
thinking” for anthropologists typically advocate for the confrontation of “the messiness and 
untidiness of social reality” in lieu of its reduction (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007, 244-
245). The definitions of childhood found in international statutes are “bright lines” of age and 
are considered “problematic considering the variation by culture, ethnicity, gender, history and 
location found in the cross-cultural record” (242). Anthropological studies have even gone so 
far as to question models or approaches that assume a universal progression from childhood 
through adulthood, from incompetency to competency, and from immaturity to maturity” 
(242). According to such theorists, children are “not only acted on by adults but also agents of 
political change and cultural interpretation. Children are at once developing beings, in 
possession of agency, and to varying degrees vulnerable” (242). This view, however, presents a 
policy dilemma. What happens when we “move away from a view of children as passive 
recipients of action and ascribe them agency and competency, or even when we shift weight to 
agency and away from children as developing beings in need of protection? What happens to 
vulnerability? How do we deal with our ethical and moral responsibilities to children and to 
others in the communities in which they live?” (243). Moreover, how do we design policy that 
will protect children from harm, but will not undermine the agency of children who already 
have so few options?   
In conclusion, the concept of childhood as a definitive phase of life which extends to age 
18 is not just ethnocentric--lacking a basis in both science and history—but detrimental to many 
independent child migrants. In the name of “harmonizing” legal instruments relating to children 
and their rights, this standard may have further victimized youth who are seeking better 
economic outcomes. The agency, the power to choose, of those under 18 is discounted, so their 
voices are not heard and their needs are not met. Further, the resources these minors might 
turn to for help have an incentive to reject them because of these laws. For example, NGOs that 
seek to help migrant laborers may turn them away and deny them their services because they 
do not want to be seen as enabling child trafficking or child labor21. The child is left without 
legal aid, health services, counseling, skills-training, and a number of other things that would 
improve his or her economic outcomes and overall migratory experience. Apart from the denial 
of key support services, these young migrants now have to find more covert ways of 
migrating—evading border authorities and--if an older brother or acquaintance is not willing to 
                                                          
21 I present an example of this from the NGO I worked with in India in Section 1.4 “Parallel Pressures on Local 
Actors” 
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risk transporting a minor—seeking out intermediaries that are perhaps not known to them and 
do not have their best interests in mind.  
1.3 Children and Labor 
In addition to questioning normative views about children and the standard of 18 years 
as the age of majority, it is also important to consider what is meant by “labor.” What 
constitutes labor or work? Who in the family should provide? What kind of economic activities 
are appropriate for a child to engage in, if any? Which of these activities constitute chores or 
“child work22” versus “child labor,” which has a more negative connotation? 
If young people, say, ages 12-17 in communities such as the ones I studied are already 
considered adult or adult-like in their communities, even younger children, as young as 6 and 7, 
are sometimes expected to assist with numerous household tasks, some perhaps more 
strenuous than anything a parent in the West would deem appropriate. In a study of fisherman 
on the coast of Andhra Pradesh, in India, boys as young as 12 would accompany their father out 
to fish, girls as young as 10  would cook with their mothers, and children as young as five would 
collect firewood (Dube 1981). In my travels I have seen 7 and 8 year olds farming alongside 
their older siblings or parents out in the fields, transporting fairly heavy loads of produce or 
water, and caring for younger siblings. None of these tasks are considered “child labor”; they 
are a reality of everyday life, seen as no different from the chores some children in the West 
are expected to complete such as washing dishware, taking out the garbage, or cleaning the 
home. The “global model of childhood” (Ansell 2005, 23) is really that of a white bourgeoisie 
child who gets to play. Any chores the child might have are seen as tasks that build character 
and foster a sense of responsibility, definitely not “child labor” in the negative sense. In fact, it 
can be concluded almost universally that “not all work is bad for children”; many see it as a 
welcome opportunity and a rite of passage into adulthood (Fyfe 1989; cited in Chandra 2008, 
4). 
Although it is not possible to generalize about all Westerners, some may see that their 
children have the luxury of playtime, compare this to prevalent child labor in low-income 
countries, and deem the parents of those children backwards and irresponsible. What this 
obscures are both the structural barriers in place that do not allow for the attainment of that 
free time and the fact that many Western children are laboring, in a sense, due to the pressure 
of getting the best grades and getting into the best universities, or due to the school to prison 
pipeline which, in the United States disproportionately affects African American and Latino 
children. Indeed, children in the United States are legally allowed to work as young as age 15 
with a work permit, and are allowed to work full-time at age 16, the cutoff age of compulsory 
education. Children even younger than 15 often babysit or receive income in exchange for work 
in other capacities. Ultimately, the economic options available to children in high-income 
                                                          
22 The term ‘child work’ has typically been used for acceptable forms of work, while the term ‘child labor’ denotes 
exploitative and unsuitable forms of work (Chandra 2008, 3-4).  
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countries—babysitting, lifeguarding, working in restaurants, etc—are simply not available to 
children (or adults) in the communities I studied. Does this mean that the work that is available 
to them—farming, domestic work, factory work, hawking, hotel/restaurant work, etc—is 
inherently bad? Perhaps not. Perhaps these things would not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
WFCLC, but again, “exploitation” is not clearly enough defined to include only the truly 
victimized and not all children who get paid too little or are treated poorly by their employers.  
The prevailing emphasis on children’s dependency and the language of victimization in 
policy contradicts the reality of many children’s lives, including many of those I had the privilege 
to interview in my time abroad.  Further, it ignores the children’s role as producers in some 
family situations, “therefore [placing] working children on the margins of what is perceived as 
proper childhood, despite the necessity or normality of their contribution to family activities” in 
these cultures (Ansell 2005, 230; Boyden 2001; Punch 2001, 805; Robson 2004, 241; cited in 
Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 5). What is hidden by these policies meant to “save” the children of 
the third world is that children were not always separate from economic activity, even in the 
West. Children were actively eliminated from the production process at a particular moment in 
history.  
Historically, the concept of ‘the child’ in the West developed during the 19th and 20th 
century (Aries 1962). The social constructionist view explains how children became 
progressively separated from the adult social world, particularly in the area of ‘work’ and ‘labor’ 
(Aries 1962; Archer 1988; cited in Chandra 2008, 2). Legislative provisions were introduced to 
prohibit children from working in factories during this period and the compulsory education 
system on a national level placed children in schools (Fyfe 1989; Weiner 1991; cited in Chandra 
2008, 2). Thus, participation in formal waged work was removed from children’s lives. The 
exclusion of children from the world of productive work “resulted in development of an image 
of children as unproductive and, therefore, dependent on others for their well-being” (Chandra 
2008, 3). Consequently, “considerations of the meaning of work for children themselves have 
been largely excluded from debate” (ibid.), replaced by  “attempts to map and quantify 
children’s work [that come] from agencies intent on its reduction, control or elimination” such 
as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF which campaign against abusive and 
exploitative forms of child labour and have developed a distinction between suitable and 
unsuitable work for children (James et al. 1998, 123).   
 
Roy Huijsmans and Simon Baker, faculty at the International Institute of Social Studies in 
the Netherlands, ask a relevant question—“if the human trafficking and child labor discourse 
appears to contain a series of problems, and may even make matters worse for young migrants 
by criminalizing their employment, why then does it continue to receive widespread support? 
(Huijsmans and Baker 2012, 928)” There are two main reasons why countries who do not 
completely agree with these provisions might have nevertheless ratified these Conventions; in 
the next section I turn to economics and international politics. 
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1.4 “Universal” Legal Standards or Response to Economic Pressure? 
The first reason has to do with a nation’s image in the international community. 
Children’s rights as set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child are “held to be universal 
and are underpinned by the principles of non-discrimination and the best interests of the child. 
Commitment to promoting and protecting children’s rights is widely taken as a mark of 
civilization and progress, and as with human rights, the principle that child rights must be 
defended ‘has become one of the commonplaces of our age.’ The impact of this concept is to 
delegitimize those societies who are unable to realize the norms of the CRC” (Pupavac 2002, 
Davidson 2011). No country wants to be regarded as “pre-modern” or uncivilized, so this need 
to preserve its reputation can be a powerful influence when it comes to the ratification of 
international legislation.  
The second reason is related, but more powerful still—a nation’s economy. Countries, 
especially developing countries, that fail to ratify certain statutes that are framed as 
“universal,” especially those as sensitive as the ones having to do with human trafficking, might 
see an impact in the amount of financial assistance and other forms of foreign aid they receive, 
in trade relations and even in tourism. Ironically, this leaves these countries that are 
admonished for non-compliance with even fewer resources with which to address the problem. 
 
The U.S. TIP Report and Neocolonial Anti-TIP Agenda 
There is no better example of both of these concepts in action than the United States’ 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. Following the adoption of the Palermo Protocol by the 
international community, the United States, under the Bush administration, passed a national 
“Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act” (TVPA) in 2000. It reads,  
The TVPA is not an empty threat, so it is not unreasonable to assume that some countries might 
take actions to ratify certain conventions simply in order to comply with US “minimum 
standards” (TVPA). 
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000  
Under the Act, the US will not, as a matter of policy, provide non-humanitarian, non-trade-
related assistance to any government that does not comply with the minimum standards [set out 
in the Act] and that is not making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance (Sec. 10a). In 
addition, such countries will also face US opposition to their seeking and obtaining funds from 
multilateral financial institutions including the World Bank and the IMF (Sec. 110(d)(1)) 
 
Box 2                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Source: ("Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000") 
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 In conjunction with the objectives of the TVPA, the U.S. State Department’s Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons began issuing a yearly “Trafficking in Persons 
Report” in 2001 in which it ranks national governments in tiers based on their “perceived 
efforts to acknowledge and combat human trafficking” – based on U.S. guidelines ("Trafficking 
in Persons Report"). The tiers outlined are as follows: 
While Tier 1 is the highest ranking, it does not indicate that a country does not have a human 
trafficking problem. A Tier 1 ranking simply indicates that a government has acknowledged the 
existence of human trafficking, has made efforts to address the problem, and that those efforts 
comply with the TVPA's minimum standards. Even once a country has achieved Tier 1 status, it 
must demonstrate “appreciable progress” in combating trafficking to maintain a Tier 1 ranking 
("Trafficking in Persons Report"). 
  With this system, the United States further globalized the human trafficking agenda and 
“not only became a major funder of anti-trafficking initiatives, but also put itself into the role of 
global anti-trafficking monitor” (Huijsmans and Baker 2012, 928). This language can be seen on 
the State Department’s webpage about the TIP Report when it claims that the Tip Report 
“reflects the U.S. Government’s commitment to global leadership on this key human rights and 
law enforcement issue” ("Trafficking in Persons Report"). These Trafficking in Persons reports 
have been important, “not least for the economic implications of performing poorly on this 
unilateral assessment of countries’ anti-trafficking efforts” (Huijsmans and Baker 2012, 928). 
Because the TIP Report is seen as a reliable resource of anti-human trafficking efforts on the 
part of national governments, these countries do not only risk losing support from the United 
States, other donor organizations and financial institutions often take these rankings into 
consideration when deciding where to allocate funds. 
 The Trafficking in Persons Report is “the principal diplomatic tool to engage foreign 
governments on human trafficking,” and certain embassy cables relating to the TIP report can 
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000                             
Tier Placements 
Tier 1: Countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards. 
 
Tier 2: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards, but 
are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. 
 
Tier 2 Watchlist: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum 
standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards 
AND: a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is 
significantly increasing; or b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat 
severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country 
is making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards was based 
on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year. 
 
Tier 3: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not 
making significant efforts to do so. 
 
Box 3                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Source: "Trafficking in Persons Report" 
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give us a lot of insight into how these diplomatic engagements unfold in each country 
("Trafficking in Persons Report"). For example, a few months after the 2006 TIP Report in which 
Malaysia was placed on the Tier 2 Watchlist was released, The U.S. Embassy of Kuala Lumpur 
provides the following summary of a meeting between the Malaysian Attorney General and 
senior U.S. officials: 
 
This excerpt is a clear example of a country preferring to keep or slightly modify its existing 
legislation, presumably legislation that more accurately reflects its understanding of the TIP 
problems unique to Malaysia, and the U.S. pressuring the government officials to pass a 
completely new piece of legislation where the structure and provisions are deemed as 
compliant with U.S. TIP ideals. The Malaysian Attorney General clearly understands what it 
would mean economically and politically for Malaysia to stay on the Tier 2 Watch List or to slip 
even further to Tier 3 (which it does in 2007), so he is willing to entertain the idea, but not 
without expressing his discomfort. The U.S. uses conditionality to achieve what it considers 
“minimum standards” and it is important to keep in mind the power that the United States has 
over whether a certain country takes an action against TIP and even over whether it ratifies 
international accords like the Palermo Protocol, for the TIP Report greatly affects public image 
and international financial support. 
Not every country reacts this way to the suggestion of drafting new Anti-TIP legislation. 
In fact, some are very willing to do it. Even so, one has to wonder whether the words in the 
final product are their own, considering the objective is to receive a specific “grade.” The TVPA 
and the TIP Report Tier System can be seen as a kind of grading rubric for countries around the 
world. I argue that this rubric stifles the local understanding of the problem and that, in turn, it 
can create weaker policy—policy that is unrealistically difficult to implement given the 
country’s resources, or policy that does not fully capture the reality of the trafficking problem, 
as it is locally experienced. 
 
U.S. Embassy Cable, Kuala Lumpur 2006  
3.  Anti-Trafficking Legislation 
 
The Government of Malaysia has not yet initiated the drafting of comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation 
pending a Cabinet-level decision as to whether to pursue a new law or to amend existing laws.  The Inspector 
General of Police, the Minister of Women, Family and Community Development, and the Minister of Home 
Affairs, have all spoken publicly expressing their support for a new law, but all made it clear in conversations 
with U.S. officials that they look for advice from the Attorney General's Office (AGO).  The Internal Security 
Ministry stated that the decision on the law rests jointly with the AGO and the Home Affairs Ministry.  
Malaysia's Attorney General has expressed skepticism on the necessity and viability of passing a new law 
and expressed to senior U.S. officials that if the GOM were to pass such a law it would only be to satisfy 
the U.S. tier-ranking process.  The Royal Malaysian Police have advised us that they intend to draft a 
proposed law which will then be submitted to the Attorney General's office for consideration, an action which 
would occur outside the normal law making process. 
Box 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Source: (Embassy Kuala Lumpur 2006, 06KUALALUMPUR2140) 
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Parallel Pressures on Local Actors 
The same types of pressure can be exerted on and felt by non-state actors such as NGOs 
and other local organizations. In a way, NGO funding politics are like a microcosm of the politics 
surrounding international diplomacy and foreign aid. These organizations’ compliance with 
international understandings of these issues—through language adopted and policies 
implemented—is often meant to preserve their reputation and image among donors and other 
funding bodies, even these dominant understandings are incongruent with local 
understandings of childhood, labor, and more. Illustrating this point further are two pieces of 
ethnographic data—one from my fieldwork in Togo and one from my work with an NGO in 
India.  
The influence of the international discourse on child labor and child trafficking on local 
organizations first struck me in Togo where I worked closely with the representative of the 
Affaires Sociales Ministry (Social Affaires) in Kpagouda. His name is Tani, and he is a young, 
good-natured government volunteer from Lomé, Togo’s capital. When I first arrived he spoke to 
me about the fairly recent anti-trafficking law23 that was passed and how his duties related to 
the provisions it set forth. After working with the U.S. Embassy cables, I know now that this 
national anti-TIP law was probably passed with significant pressure from the United States 
because in 2005 Togo was on the Tier 3 list and had been heavily criticized in that year’s TIP 
report for not moving forward fast enough with this new legislation ("Country Narratives - 
Togo" 2005).  
              One of Tani’s favorite ventures was the club d’enfants that he inaugurated in the village. 
He used these weekly “kids’ club” meetings as a kind of after-school program in which he 
taught the children many things—songs, dances, riddles—and also sought to “sensitize” them 
to their rights as children and other relevant issues. He later told me that after joining the 
Ministry as a volunteer, he had undergone a 4-day yearly training session in Lomé on the rights 
of children, how to handle cases of abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and even what kinds of 
actions one should take in regards to repatriated children. Sitting in on these meetings at the 
time I was struck by how enthusiastically all of the children participated, but the significance of 
the precise language Tani was using did not dawn on me until now.  
At one point the children learned a song about Les droits de l’enfant (the rights of the 
child)—essentially a bite-size version of the CRC set to music. Tani took this opportunity to drill 
a particular point home. He started a call-and-response chanting “I should only do work/tasks 
that are appropriate for my…?” The children would shout back “Capacité!” (Roughly, capacity, 
referring to one’s size, strength, and other abilities).  He repeated this about 10 times and the 
children got louder with each repetition. Notice Tani did not mention age at any point when 
speaking of labor. This moment was the CRC and the WFCLC in action—because this is how Tani 
was trained by UNICEF in the capital to talk about these things--but with a local twist. In rural 
Togo, an infrequency of birth certificates means that many people do not know their “real” age, 
in the legal sense. Thus, Tani taught them that the kind of work appropriate for them was work 
that corresponded to their abilities (physical and mental), not their age.  The fact that Tani 
                                                          
23 Loi 2005-009 Du 3 Aout 2005 Relative Au Trafic D'enfants Au Togo (2005). 
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understood this and presented the information slightly differently exemplifies how these 
dominant understandings stifle local knowledge of the situation.  
Similarly, Tani had the children put on a skit about youth who leave the village. The 
message or moral of the act was that migration at a young age has its dangers, but the most 
interesting part to me was that it was framed in terms of migration, not trafficking. The children 
in the skits exhibited agency and were actively choosing whether to migrate for employment or 
not, weighing the pros and cons. The children may not have understood this activity framed in 
the language of trafficking and victimization because it would not have captured the full picture 
of their reality. This is an example of how the language of victimization risks imposing on a 
community that does not relate to it. Tani has an obligation to enforce the new anti-TIP law 
because neglecting to do so would mean risking his post, but he has “sensitized” both children 
and adults to this law using more of a local narrative. 
Like Tani’s use of the CRC and WFCLC in the kids’ club, the following extended example 
from India showcases the influence of the dominant international discourse on child labor. In 
India I was working at a skills-training institute in Rajasthan established in 2008 to provide 
migrants with affordable skills-training.  The idea is that with proper training in carpentry, 
marble-cutting, tailoring, motorcycle repair, and other trades, migrants will be able to secure 
more profitable employment and even start up their own enterprises, instead of migrating to 
out-of-state urban centers and falling into low-paying (and in many cases exploitative) 
employment. The institute's target population includes individuals who are over 18, financially 
needy (cannot afford other private skills training institutes), and on the threshold of migration.   
From a side project in which I redesigned the institute’s English brochure, I learned a bit 
more about its marketing and funding strategy. It is not difficult to see why there might be 
limited government support and international funding for a program that aids able-bodied 
men, the demographic of the majority of the migrant population in Rajasthan. Many more 
donors (especially international donors) are interested in helping those who are more 
“pitiable”—such as youth and women. This is precisely why I was encouraged to put a picture of 
a physically handicapped 18 year old girl holding up a template for the garments she had just 
learned to sew on the cover of 
the brochure. The truth is that 
the institute has hosted far 
fewer female "batches" of 
trainees than male batches 
and though it advertises itself 
as training and employment 
placement program for rural 
youth, many trainees are in 
their late 20s and 30s.  
When I asked why the 
institute’s training policies 
barred individuals under 18 
years old, I was told outright 
by my mentor that this was a 
strategic decision because the 
The trainee I was asked to photograph for the Aajeevika brochure  
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Institute “could not afford to lose funding by being perceived as facilitating child labor.” This 
outcome is socially inefficient because the age of compulsory education in India is only 14, so if 
one attends school every year until one is allowed to discontinue one’s studies, that person still 
cannot legally work most informal sector jobs that would be available to him with that level of 
education. This person would be caught between unemployment and working illegally as a child 
laborer. In this case, Aajeevika complied with the dominant narrative about children and their 
capacities when it comes to labor, but the situation again reflects how international policy 
affects the lives of real people on the ground by influencing local organizations and the policies 
they implement.  
 
1.5 Compassion Fatigue and the Commodification of Extreme Cases 
 Apart from demonstrating how international and subsequent national laws can put 
pressure on local actors to adopt a certain vocabulary and implement certain policies, the 
example of the girl and the brochure points to a broader global phenomenon that has likewise 
influenced policy attention-- compassion fatigue and the subsequent use of sensationalism, 
which has heavily influenced the discursive climate and policy attention to child trafficking and 
child labor.  
What does child labor look like? Do images of tear-stained cheeks, torn dirty clothing, 
exposed ribs, and young children carrying heavy loads or handling dangerous tools come to 
mind? If so, this would indicate the success of child rights advocates in highlighting the worst, 
most extreme cases of the abuse and exploitation of children worldwide. The image saturation 
in the Western world of these children through a “well-established trope in media—poverty 
porn,” have yielded an affliction called “compassion fatigue” (Meikle 2013). In a world riddled 
with compassion fatigue, only the most heart-wrenching, sensational stories get out. We no 
longer care to pay attention “[unless] someone is dead or dying” (ibid.).  
Ali Heller, a doctoral candidate in socio-cultural anthropology at Washington University 
in St. Louis who is writing a dissertation on fistula patients in Niger, asks in her blog, “why must 
we highlight the extreme cases when the norm is bad enough?” (Heller 2013). While this 
journalistic strategy might have spread awareness and raised funds for a noble cause, it is 
important to consider what effect this has had on policy and subsequent efforts to help child 
migrants, who represent the norm rather than the extreme. One way to think about it is to 
consider stereotypes; as Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has said, “The problem 
with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story 
become the only story” (Ngozi Adichie 2009). The focus on extreme examples of highly 
vulnerable child migrants such as victims of sex-trafficking, organ-trafficking, bonded labor, and 
“modern slavery” has resulted in “a totalizing discourse where the diversity of children’s 
experiences and work situations becomes treated as equivalent, reducing all working children 
to the status of victims” and characterizing them without agency (Davidson 2005).  
The problem with this is that many child migrants are not victims of trafficking, but are 
nevertheless categorized as such. This artificially inflate the number of victims of child-
trafficking worldwide. This has kept it on the political agenda as a pressing issue, but 
incomplete information breeds incomplete policy, policy not tailored to all child migrants. By 
identifying independent child migrants as victims of trafficking, we miss an opportunity to study 
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the bigger issues. The strong focus on trafficking and the worst forms of child labor in child 
rights advocacy has “framed the debates about independent child migration and many in-depth 
studies have centered on working conditions and potential hazards at the destination” (Hashim 
and Thorsen 2011, 81). Not as many studies have focused on sending regions and the 
underlying reasons behind child migration. Many child migrants “by no means view themselves 
as ‘victims’. As they make their decisions with or without adult involvement, they may view 
migration as a significant opportunity to exercise their own life choices and improve their 
opportunities” (Whitehead 2011, 120). 
 
1.6 International Legislation and Child Migration 
In short, much of the legislation explored in this chapter exhibits top-down thinking, 
heavy Western influence, and a failure to include “local” understandings of childhood and 
labor. Its prevalence, both in terms of number of ratifications and influence on the ground, 
regardless of these shortcomings, can be attributed to outside pressures such as the U.S. TIP 
program and other donor interests. Finally, a focus on a non-representational subset of cases 
meant to galvanize support obscures how large and diverse this population of child migrants is 
and has prevented a deeper investigation into the source of this phenomenon. 
In order to address these shortcomings as they relate to the movement of youth, 
researchers must actively question, complicate, and deconstruct the trafficking and child labor 
discourse and explore its effects. To this end, the following chapter will show, through primary 
research, that children much younger than eighteen can be agentive economic actors in a world 
that affords them few other options, not quite fitting the role of the “victim” they have been 
relegated to. I will first highlight how the high policy visibility of child trafficking and child labor 
has meant that comparatively little research has been done on independent child migration. I 
will then deconstruct the term “independent” and entertain counterarguments about 
constrained agency. Finally, I will highlight the profiles of six child migrants that I interviewed in 
both Togo and India to show why acknowledging even very “thin” agency is important.   
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Chapter 2: Independent Child Migrants- constraints, 
vulnerability, and the importance of agency 
  
2.1 Child Migration Research Eclipsed by Child Trafficking 
Migration at the international level has been increasing exponentially, as Figure 2 
shows. In 2005, there were an estimated 191 million international migrants, nearly two-and-a-
half times the figure in 1965 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2006, 20). Five 
short years later, in 2010, this number had risen to over 214 million (ibid.). Just over 12.4 
percent, about 27 million, of this total number of international migrants are youth aged 15 to 
24 (ibid.). Moreover, at least a third of all migrants from developing countries are estimated to 
be 18 years of age or younger24 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2006, 4; UNFPA 
2005). Although internal migration is not 
as well understood as international 
migration, it is projected that an even 
higher percentage of internal migration 
is made up of this young demographic 
(Rajan 2013, 6-8). Although children and 
youth account for a large proportion of 
migrants in both international and 
internal migration streams, as of 2011, 
only about 60 studies had been done on 
child migration worldwide, and of 
those, only 16 contain quantitative 
survey data (Whitehead 2011, 102). 
Children’s migration is by no means a 
new phenomenon, present in almost all 
communities that have a high incidence 
of adult migration, but specific attention 
to it is relatively recent within policy and academic spheres25 (UNFPA 2005). 
The attention child migration has garnered has been eclipsed by the high visibility of a 
particular group—trafficked children and other children in extremely dangerous situations.  
Whitehead, a professor of anthropology, gender and development at the University of Sussex 
and director of the Migration Development Research Centre on Migration (now the Migrating 
out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, or RPC) maintains that “as a result, [of this 
visibility] these particular segments of child migrants and their experiences are seen as 
representing all child migrants” (Whitehead 2011, 104). While not visible in the sense that they 
are easy to find or identify, trafficked children have extraordinarily high policy visibility. This has 
                                                          
24 Given the high level of age misreporting due to fear of being found in violation of certain laws, the true number 
of migrant children in the world could be much higher 
25 “Children on the Move in the Developing World,” a conference held by the Development Research Centre on 
Migration, Globalization and Poverty at the University of Sussex, UK, in May 2008 is especially regarded as having 
been an impetus for further research on child migration (Ensor and Goździak 2010, 7) 
Figure 2                                                                                                                
Source: (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013) 
International migrants, 1990-2013 (millions) 
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resulted from, as I mentioned in Ch 1, the success of well-intentioned advocacy groups in 
raising awareness and funds for this particular population of child migrants by focusing on 
extreme cases despite them being “very much outside the norm” (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 
13-14). Further, much of the non-academic literature on this topic “comes from agencies 
providing services especially for children who have gotten into serious difficulties” such as 
those who are victims of sex-trafficking and organ-trafficking, so it highlights concerns specific 
to this population (Whitehead 2011, 104).  
At the moment, the policy space to make recommendations regarding independent child 
migrants is very narrow. It is flanked, on one side, by the international conventions and 
protocols aimed at protecting children and, on the other side, by the success of advocacy efforts 
aimed at particularly abused and vulnerable children: children in domestic servitude or bonded 
labor, “street” children, and “trafficked” children. The success of international advocacy on 
exploited and abused child migrants has inadvertently made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
address the very real needs of other child migrants (Whitehead and Hashim 2005, 4). 
 
2.2 Truly Independent? 
My intent is not to trivialize the plight of children in dire circumstances. I mean to show 
how the bias toward this group in terms of research, policy, and mobilization of resources is 
problematic for other child migrants. Since research available heavily influences policy 
produced, the result is pieces of legislation like the WFCLC and the Palermo Protocol, examined 
in Chapter 1, that do not present a nuanced account of children’s mobility or their relationship 
with work or labor. Because the Palermo Protocol necessitates the ambiguous notion of 
“exploitation” as the “key to defining a trafficked child,” and since victims of trafficking are the 
most visible in this discourse, the association of children migrating alone and of necessarily bad 
outcomes is inextricably entrenched, precluding the possibility of the benefits of migration 
(Whitehead 2007).  
In this discursive climate, there is no room for independent child labor migrants. Even 
academic literature that distances itself from this dominant negative view of child migration 
employs terms that still perpetuate normative notions of childhood. Children can be theorized 
as “migrating alongside migrant workers,” essentially passive dependents tagging along behind 
the “primary” migrants—the child’s parents, siblings, friends, intermediaries, or other adults 
(Whitehead 2011). Other terms that aim to describe children migrating on their own are 
“separated children,” “asylum-seeking children” and “unaccompanied minors,” (Hashim and 
Thorsen 2011, 17-18). I argue that these seem to impose a value judgment and imply that these 
children are missing something--the presence of adults. It assumes that adults are necessarily 
involved in the successful movement of youth and that the lack of this parental presence 
automatically puts children in a position of helplessness (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 5).  
The above terms did not seem to align with many of the remarkable stories of resiliency 
that I had been privileged to hear. I chose to employ the term “independent child migrant” 
because it was the only one that allowed for the possibility of both positive and negative 
outcomes of youth migration, but it also begs certain questions.  To get to simply “child 
migrant,” one has to acknowledge the possibility of a child as a migrant separate from his or her 
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parents. Examples of this aspect are fairly easy to prove, as there are many children living and 
working “at destination” without their parents or guardians. To accept the addition of 
“independent,” one must ask, “independent of what?” It is not just the absence of a parental 
presence or the establishment of the child as a separate entity; “independent” invokes 
autonomy and self-reliance; the ability to exercise agency. This part is more difficult to prove or 
measure. For the purposes of this paper, I am employing “the capacity of individuals to act 
independently and to make their own free choices” as the definition of agency (Barker 2003). If 
agency is the ability to make one’s own choices, this, to me, is at the core of what sets 
independent child migrants apart from victims of trafficking; not that they somehow make up a 
different demographic or that they do not navigate the same risks, but that they consented, 
they wanted to migrate, they exercised their agency.  
 
2.3 Children’s Agency and its Structural Constrains 
 One might counter this argument by asking, “are the choices of independent child 
migrants really their own?” “Is anyone in these poor, rural, underserved communities really 
independent when they have so few viable choices?” Choices, and thus agency, are constrained 
by structures and can amount to structural violence. If structures are “the recurrent patterned 
arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available,” then the 
structure versus agency debate questions whether individuals act as independent “free agents” 
or in a manner dictated by social structure (Barker 2003).  The structures at play that influence 
a child’s ability to exercise agency are shown in Figure 3.   
  At the macro-level, there is public policy which dictates the legal dimensions of one’s 
life—the age of majority, the age of compulsory education, child labor laws, child trafficking 
laws—as well as the resources and quality of resources available to you, such as education, 
healthcare, and so on. At the meso-level, there is society which dictates different classes and 
stereotypes and expectations therein. In society we sees the manifestation of institutional bias, 
racism, sexism, and more, and it normalizes and “others” certain practices such as migration. 
Society is further influenced by history and policy. Next we have the community, which may 
have certain unique practices relating to, say, religion or ethnicity, such as marriage practices, 
land distribution, gender norms, family structure and dynamics. Influenced by society and the 
community as a whole is the family at the micro-level. The family might have its own unique 
traditions, values and collective goals, separate from those of the community. Finally there is 
the individual, influenced by all of the above layers, but owner of his or her own hopes, desires, 
beliefs and values (Crépeau et al. 2013).  
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Figure 3  
Since agency, the ability to exercise choice, is affected by the options available which 
are in turn dictated by all of the aforementioned structures, it would be too simplistic to say 
that independent child migrants transcend all of this and act completely autonomously. Various 
researchers have referred to this limited agency as “thin” (Klocker 2007, Yaqub 2009; 
Whitehead, Hashim and Iversen 2007; Huijsmans 2008). Klocker details how agency is 
“thinned” by factors such as “the social obedience and submission that are central to child-
adult relations; internalized inferiority from prevailing gender values; stereotypical attitudes 
towards ethnic or regional groups and towards people who are simply poor (Klocker 2007). 
Since different people’s agency is “thinned” to different degrees by different factors, agency, 
for both children and adults in these communities, is on a continuum. It is important to also 
note that agency and vulnerability (to different risks and types of exploitation) are not mutually 
exclusive. One can be autonomous and still be vulnerable to a number of risk factors. Instead, 
“both characteristics may manifest themselves simultaneously in varying degrees, depending 
on the children’s circumstances” (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007, 242). Despite all of this 
grey area, the consent, the choice, the agency (no matter how “thin” or “thick”) of children 
under the age of 18 is categorically disregarded by policymakers and practitioners and they are 
denied the right to choose what direction their lives take. Without an understanding of the 
complexity of this issue in the real lives of the people it affects, policy and efforts to support 
victims of trafficking and other crimes, which are assumed to encompass and protect all mobile 
children, will continue to fail to meet the needs of independent child migrants.  
 
Structures Acting on Individual Agency 
Public Policy
Society
Community
Family
Individual
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2.4 Measuring the “Thickness” of Agency 
Determining thickness of agency is very difficult to do. Childhood researchers and other 
academics have begun to further our understanding of independent child migrants through 
pro-child studies that aim to identify their specific needs. These studies explore “children’s lived 
experiences, how young persons are actively involved in their worlds; in shaping them, in 
negotiating them and in challenging them” (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 127). They have 
attempted to gain as much understanding as possible about the situations these migrants are 
in, their motivations, and learn what kind of support they need to have more positive migratory 
experiences, or at least fewer negative ones. They have done this by consulting and speaking 
with the children themselves, listening to their opinions, and giving them a voice by 
acknowledging that their age does not prevent them from being able to exercise agency and 
make decisions about their own lives.  I offer the following profiles of migrants that I spoke to 
as a contribution to that growing dialogue and as way to continue to think about the question 
of agency. 
 Every child migrant’s experience is unique, characterized by a number of overlapping 
factors and structures partially enumerated above, but in my interviews I did begin to notice 
some common patterns and ultimately identified the following six26 “types” of child migrants—
The Runaway, The Legacy, The Student, The Dropout, the Adventurer, and The Girl. For each of 
these profiles, I will recount the migration story of an individual whose circumstances I think 
particularly encompass the main features of that type. I will then identify what these specific 
features are and add an analysis of the “thickness” of the migrant’s agency, given contextual 
circumstances, site-specific themes at play, and areas of vulnerability. Finally, I will hold the 
child’s unique situation against the legal provisions of laws that would have had jurisdiction 
over such a case and show why they would have been inadequate, ineffective, or even 
detrimental. Examining the complexity in the lives of real individuals is the clearest way to see 
how easily legal binaries (child/adult, victim/criminal, exploited/not exploited, etc) breakdown 
on the ground.  
2.5 Child Migrant Profiles 
The Runaway 
I try my best to keep up as my host sister Tajal leads my translator, Shweta, and me well 
beyond the borders of Gurutaraj, the village I was staying in in the Kherlumbar block of 
Udaipur in southern Rajasthan. Soon, after Tajal pauses to decide which path to take 
now that the paved road had ended, we turn and head up a hill, keeping parallel to a 
wall of cacti that separated two fields of wheat. She was taking us to a man she knew of 
who had left the village at a very young age to go work in Mumbai.  
                                                          
26 This is by no means an exhaustive list. There are likely many more types of child migrants that could be 
proposed. 
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His mother greets us first. Tall, elegant, and vibrant against the foliage in her bright red 
poshak27, she invites us to the porch of a small cement home painted bright blue and 
adorned with Rajasthani wall paintings. Tajal introduces us and explains that we were 
hoping to talk to her son, Abhimanyu about his work in Mumbai.  
There was no need for her to call out, as Abhimanyu had already emerged from behind 
the curtain that led inside the house.  Smiling in a purple sleeveless shirt with a thin gold 
chain around his neck, Abhimanyu sits on the ledge of the porch, ready to tell us his 
story.  
Abhimanyu is the eldest child in the family. His parents are both subsistence farmers who 
had never left the village in search of employment. Now 33, he tells us that he was 
merely 16 or 17 when he decided to go work in Mumbai. I asked if his decision was at all 
connected to his schooling and he answered, “I was in 10th standard and actually doing 
pretty well in school, but my parents weren’t giving me any spending money. I wanted to 
go out and earn for myself, but I didn’t tell them I was leaving because I knew that they 
would try to stop me. They would want me to keep with my studies.” 
We asked about the process. Why Mumbai? Did he know of specific employment 
opportunities there or was he just going to play it by ear? How did he travel there? Was 
he alone? Was he afraid? Why or why not? Apparently, one of his classmate’s family had 
a travel business in Kherlumbar and they told him of a relative of theirs who owned a 
balloon factory in Mumbai. His classmate’s family assured him that if he went there, 
their relative would employ him.  
Abhimanyu left in the middle of the night with “nothing but the clothes on [his] back.”” 
He walked the 7km to Kherlumbar, met up with his classmate, and got on a bus to 
Udaipur free of cost thanks to his friend’s connection to the travel agency. His classmate 
actually accompanied him as far as Udaipur, about 45minutes away. Once there, the 
classmate pointed out to Abhimanyu other travelers who were going to Mumbai, some 
specifically to the same balloon factory, and was told to “stick with them.” From 
Udaipur, Abhimanyu took a train with money borrowed from his classmate.  
He made it to the balloon factory safely and became the classmate’s brother in law’s 
assistant at the factory. This man allowed Abhimanyu to live with him and paid him an 
initial salary of 800 rs/month ($13 USD) which eventually increased to 4,000 rs/month 
($67 USD) during the 4-5 years he worked there. He mostly ran errands and “loved it 
there” because “it was easy work and work was good. I had the opportunity to rise 
quickly through the ranks.” 
Meanwhile, his parents had not heard from him for about 6 months, until he works up 
the courage to call home. They were furious and begged him to come home, but in those 
                                                          
27 The traditional dress of women in the Rajput community of Rajasthan. The poshak consists of the kanchli (supportive 
undershirt with sleeves), a waist-length kurta (a sleeveless blouse), the ghagra (skirt), and the odhna (veil). 
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4-5 years he ended up only returning for his sister’s wedding. Of the money he was 
making, he was keeping 30% for himself and sending 70% to his family with people he 
knew and trusted bus drivers who were returning to Kherlumbar from Mumbai. 
At this point in the interview, his mother chimed in and said that even with the money he 
had been sending them, she would have still preferred he stay and continue his studies. 
Abhimanyu smiled and disagreed saying “no, money is better.”  
Abhimanyu’s employer saw potential in him and when he started entertaining the idea 
of starting his own business, he offered Abhimanyu 10,000rs a month to stay, but “of 
course, understood and supported me when I said no.” Now, Abhimanyu owns and 
operates his own trash business and shop which people call if they need trash or 
recyclables picked up. He is now making 5-6,000rs/month.  
When asked about whether he regretted not taking the 10,000rs offer, he responded 
“the difference I make up in the satisfaction of knowing that I am my own boss and have 
my own business.” Abhimanyu is still sending 70% of his salary to his family, which 
helped pay for his sister’s wedding and other household expenses. For now “Mumbai is 
fine, but if I save enough money I think I would like to come back to Gurutaraj and farm 
or build a house or start another business, maybe a general store, a garment store, a 
mill, or something like that.” 
In all, I talked to four 
child migrants who had run 
away from home in India (all 
male) and six in Togo (five 
males, one female), along with 
some of their family members. 
The narrative of “the runaway” 
is typically marked by one or 
several of these factors—
intergenerational conflict, 
family poverty, frustration with 
school (not learning anything 
because of poor education 
quality, or not passing 
important28 exams, or both), 
and a longing for adventure or 
exposure to a wider world. Runaways are among the most agentive of child migrants. These 
children “run away because they have information regarding where they can run to and the 
                                                          
28 Both in India and Togo there are exams at the end of high school that essentially decide what path your future 
takes. It is a lot of stress to put on students who do not have the resources to excel, because they are nevertheless 
compared to the children of the nation’s elites who perhaps live in cities and attended private schools.   
Abhimanyu at his mother’s home 
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possibilities of being able to survive should they do so (Hashim 2008, 8; cited in Hashim and 
Thorsen 2011, 43) They actively weigh their options, however limited, may or may not consult 
their parents, siblings, elders, or peers, and choose to migrate away from home based on 
reasoning that reflects their personal values. In some cases, the child has spoken with the 
parents and the parents refused, but the child left anyway. In other cases, the child left in 
complete secrecy. The runaway may or may not seek or accept the help of an intermediary.  
Applied to Abhimanyu’s case, even at the young age of 16, he decided to leave home 
without telling anybody except his friend and his friend’s family. As far as motivation, 
intergenerational relationships and the fact that his parents weren’t giving him spending money 
played the biggest role. The desire for his own money can be seen as a desire to be 
autonomous, which he also demonstrated choosing to not return home for so many years29.  
The vulnerability he might have faced in the act of migrating alone was counteracted by his 
decision to consult and accept help from a peer and to take safe transportation, rather than 
seeking out an intermediary. Though technically a child, Abhimanyu excelled at his job, through 
remittances became one of his family’s main sources of income, and eventually started his own 
business. The fact that his own business paid less than what his previous employer was offering 
to pay him to stay at the factory and his comments to me on this decision solidifies the idea 
that autonomy is very important to him. Further, Abhimanyu has plans to return and impact his 
community through a different economic venture in the future. Abhimanyu chose to break 
from a tradition of agriculture.  
Since Abhimanyu did not cross national borders, only state, he did not face constraints 
on his movement such as border patrol that might have stopped an unaccompanied minor. As a 
result, he did not have to seek out an intermediary and took safe transportation to his 
destination. If we turn from trafficking legislation to child labor standards, as far as exploitation, 
Abhimanyu’s wages were well below the minimum daily wage in Rajasthan, even for an 
unskilled worker, but how are we to judge whether this was “exploitation” or a “worst form of 
child labor, especially when it is a reality even for adults in the informal labor sector? Regarding 
conditions in the workplace, Abhimanyu worked as an assistant and as such was likely not doing 
any dangerous work with machinery. He had a good relationship with his employer, who 
become something of a mentor to him. He learned a lot of things and gained experience that 
has led him to become economically independent as well as a provider for his family. The 
WFCLC and any derivative national laws that ban child labor30 and enforce this ban would 
probably have hurt Abhimanyu in this situation unless, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, there were 
effective repatriation and rehabilitation programs to accompany these employer raids.  
The Legacy 
Weddings have a way of bringing people together in Gurutaraj. All of the migrant men in 
the families, extended families, and even neighbors of the betrothed who are working in 
Udaipur, Ahmedabad, and other major destinations for circular labor migrants make 
their way back to the village for the multi-day ceremonies.  
                                                          
29 This village was characterized by circular migration and in circular migration one typically returns every 4-6 
months. Waiting years to return, by choice, is rare.  
30 Indian Child Labor law was most recently updated in 2006 to ban “soft” labor as well. 
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One day my host family’s Rajput31 neighbors and good friends were celebrating the 
arrival of their youngest son’s new bride to the village, for in India, much like in Togo, it 
is the woman who moves in with her husband’s family after being married. I was invited 
to come over and was lucky enough to witness some of the Rajput marriage traditions 
which involve the groom and his mother symbolically welcoming the new bride and 
accepting her into their family. The next day, my host mother suggested that I interview 
the groom, as he had been migrating to Ahmedabad for several years and would be 
returning in a few days.  
*** 
Tejpal greets me cordially and 
his mother brings out some 
water for us as we sit down in 
the courtyard. He explains that 
he is the youngest of four 
siblings, with an older brother 
and two older sisters. His 
father used to be a private 
driver in Ahmedabad but had 
recently retired because “he is 
too old now for such work.” 
His older brother is also a 
driver, although he worked as 
a waiter in a hotel for several 
years. He himself went to 
school until he was 17 and 
then, he says, “I left my studies because I wanted to help my family. Classes were OK but 
I felt that I needed to help my family financially like my brother since my father was not 
working anymore.” He says his father had no problem with his decision to leave school 
for work because “he did the same thing, at an even earlier age; after 8th standard I 
think.” And so, the next time his brother came to visit, he left with his youngest sibling in 
tow. Although he did not have an assured job waiting for him, his brother was able to 
find him a position at a different hotel restaurant within three days.  
 
Tejpal worked at the restaurant for 2-3 years, coming home every 4-5 months for 
“functions at home—weddings, Holi, and other important events, my employer was very 
flexible”  and made 3,500 rupees a month, which eventually increased to 4,500 rupees a 
month ($75). The money he remitted ranged from 10,000-15,000 rupees each visit. 
When asked about his work conditions, he answered that “they were good. I only had to 
work from 11am-3pm and then from 7pm-11pm and the restaurant provided food, but 
                                                          
31 A member of one of the patrilineal clans of western, central, northern India and some parts of Pakistan. They 
claim to be descendants of ruling Hindu warrior classes of North India. Classified as a “forward” rather than a 
“backward” caste (Balfour, 473). 
Tejpal and his new wife on the day she joins her mother-in-law’s home 
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the money was not enough. I have to pay 2,000-3,000 just to rent my room in 
Ahmedabad.”  
 
Soon after, Tejpal found a job at the restaurant he currently works at which pays 7,000 
rupees each month. He has supplemented this salary recently because he learned to 
drive like his father and brother and is “driving people on the side, for extra money to 
pay for the marriage.” He adds, “I only drive a few times a week because it is very tiring, 
but it pays very well, 10,000-15,000 a month depending on how much I drive. I have to 
work for my family for my whole life, so I have to pace myself.” When I ask whether he 
enjoys living in the city, he replies that “Gurutaraj and Kherlumbar are much better than 
the big city. I would rather be here with my family, but I need to provide for them. I hope 
to maybe open up a business in Kherlumbar in the future.” 
 
In a majority of households in both India and Togo from which I identified and 
interviewed a migrant, there was also at least one other family member that had migrated at 
some point in time. Legacies are influenced by these examples of migrants in their families. 
They may or may not migrate at the same age, to the same location, or work in the same labor 
sector. The whole family--or at least the parents or guardians-- is typically involved in the 
decision of whether or not to migrate, where, and how. The extent to which parents push for 
labor over continued education depends on the family’s financial situation. Sometimes the 
legacy decides to go because of the pride that comes from following in someone’s footsteps; 
sometimes the legacy is mostly pressured by the family’s expectation of a traditional role to be 
filled, a sense of duty; sometimes it is a little bit of both. Factors highlighted in other profiles 
such as the desire for adventure, financial independence, and family poverty converge to 
influence the legacy’s decision.  
In Tejpal’s case, it is difficult to determine how the retirement32 of a breadwinner, his 
father, measures up to Tejpal’s pride as a man of this particular family which has a history of 
circular migration. Other anecdotal evidence suggests that this employment strategy had been 
normalized within the family and had become part of a household accumulation strategy, 
rather than a desperate fight against abject poverty. Put into the context of the village of 
Gurutaraj, I think it is important to reiterate from the fieldsite descriptions that Tejpal’s family, 
my host family, and a handful of other Rajput families were technically members of a high caste 
relative to other members of the village, as it was mostly comprised of “tribals” or STs from the 
Meena tribe. My own data in addition to anecdotal evidence and Aajeevika’s Kherlumbar 
migration report show that driving, hotel work, and working in shops are typically reserved33 for 
Rajputs and other “general castes” members, while jobs like construction and work in factories 
that required manual labor were usually associated with Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled 
Castes (SCs)34. Tejpal saw working as a hotel employee and driver as a fulfillment of his role as a 
                                                          
32 The retirement, death, or sickness of a breadwinner have similar effects on child migrants’ decision-making. 
33 See figure 6 in Appendix  
34 Considered the “lowest” of the castes. 
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Rajput male who was coming of age. Several years later his motivations turned to accumulating 
wealth for his future marriage, a socially necessitated life event as well as a family value, and he 
succeeded. Now he is able to provide for his wife and family, although he must work very hard 
to do so.  
Like Abhimanyu, Tejpal was affected by land segmentation and the lack of sustainable 
and “suitable” (for a Rajput) employment opportunities close by. The fact that he longs to come 
home to his village suggests that he would have made different choices if there were different 
opportunities available him, viable opportunities close to the Gurutaraj, but it is unclear 
whether this necessarily means the choice was not his own. Perhaps he, like many child 
migrants, simply made the choice to migrate given opportunities available to him, which are 
structurally influenced. 
Also like Abhimanyu, Tejpal did not cross any national borders, so he did not face any 
major constraints on his movement. As a result, he was able to travel without incident with his 
brother. However, if the provisions of the Palermo Protocol were enforced in this case, Tejpal’s 
consent to migration and to traveling with his brother would have been disregarded 
considering that he was not yet 18 and that his low salary could have been deemed 
exploitative.    
The Student     
 One day François and Jacob stop by my host family’s homestead on their way back from 
the fields and inform me that they planned to leave for Benin that same night. By this time, two 
other Duke students and I had already gotten permission and made plans to go to Benin for a 
few days to examine this particular migration destination and speak to some of the Beninese 
employers of young migrant men from Togo. The three of us talk a bit about their travel plans 
and agree to try and connect again in Benin so I could interview them again at destination. 
Assuming I would see them later that evening before they left, my host sisters and I set out to 
find eggs for a chocolate cake we wanted to attempt to bake that night. To my delight, the cake 
turns out wonderfully, despite the lack of many of the tools I would have considered essential, 
such as an oven, a way to measure the temperature of the fire, and a cake pan. Long after the 
sun goes down, leaving us with nothing but flashlights and lanterns, the homestead is a truly 
abuzz with laughter and cries of joy. Many neighbors join us as we dance, blow out candles for 
no one’s birthday in particular, and devour the cake. I insist that some be set aside for François 
and Jacob as a parting gift, but they never come. Only then did it occur to me that their cell 
phones would not work outside of Togo and the likelihood of us finding each other in Benin was 
slim indeed.  
 Although I did not see the boys again that summer after their journey, I did chance upon 
François’ family while conducting my household survey in Kpagouda Pough. Their home is 
located up on the mountain right next to an enormous, beautiful baobab tree. Tani’s mother is 
out in the courtyard husking corn, her young daughter sorting through a bowl of baobab seeds 
at her side, when Jesper and I catch her attention. She and her husband welcome us and begin 
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to tell us about their children with palpable pride. They explain that the two children in the 
home, a young girl and boy, are two of six children, François being the third oldest overall and 
eldest male. François’ oldest sister is married and lives in Kpagouda down in the plain, “and is 
raising two children of her own.” The second oldest sister migrated to Benin “since a long time 
back” and is now married and working in a hotel there.  Tani, currently in Benin, had been 
migrating there every summer since he was 16, "but only to faire la rentrée, so he can pay for 
his school fees. This year he will go for his Bac35 and then to university, God willing.” The next 
youngest sister “went to Benin last year at age 16 and is now in Nigeria working for a family in 
their home, cleaning and tending to their children. Last year she brought back money and 
assiettes (dinnerware), so we are hoping she does well this year too. She will be home in 
December.” The youngest two attend the primary school on the mountain, but “will be moving 
down to the plain like Tani for collège and lycée36.” 
 Before leaving, Jesper 
reminds me to take a photo of the 
family, as we had been doing with 
many of our interviewees, with 
the promise that I would print 
them and send them back to Togo 
for them to keep. The mother and 
daughter sit at the base of the 
baobab while the son runs back in 
the house. He returns wearing an 
oversized coat and hands his 
father a radio. The father places a 
cigarette in his mouth and nods to 
signal that they are ready. 
I was unable to speak to François’ parents about each of their children and their 
individual decisions to migrate, but theirs is an example of a household with multiple young 
circular labor migrants. Although only three out of the six seem to be going to school regularly, 
education is clearly important to this family. Although the parents did not indicate this 
explicitly, it is possible to infer given the reference to “moving down to the plain.”  
Kpagouda Pough only has a primary school. To continue on to middle and high school, 
many children like Tani are sent to live with other families in Kpagouda’s plain region37, in 
nearby towns, or even in southern Togo. This system of fostering is well established in West 
Africa. My host grandmother, who housed both François, Jacob, and another boy named Victor, 
                                                          
35 The baccalauréat, known colloquially as le bac, is an test which French and international students take at the end 
of high school. 
36 The equivalent of middle school and high school, respectively.  
37 When I asked my host mother for clarification about this, she explained that most school children return home 
for lunch at midday and then return to school in the afternoon. For children living in Kpagouda’s mountain region, 
Kpagouda Pough, this is too far a trek to do multiple times a day so it is easier to live with foster families. 
François’ family 
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treated them all as sons of her own, and in turn they cultivated her fields and were able to go 
to school. In some cases, like with many of the young students who go to southern Togo, 
children work in the homes (girls) or fields (boys) of the families that are fostering them, and 
the families in turn pay for their school fees. Enduring abusive working conditions, physical, and 
even sexual abuse at the hands of fostering families is not uncommon, even when the families 
are blood relatives, but often this form of migration is a means to an end—education.  
These schools are not expensive 
private schools. Even public schools in Togo 
are cost-prohibitive for many families. School 
fees recently rose in 2008 and children have 
to pay for their own uniforms, books, and 
school supplies, with few scholarships or kits 
escolairs available. Given these constraints, 
Francois must migrate to stay in school and 
achieve his dreams of higher education. Even 
though François is not bringing home a 
motorcycle or other items of social value, the 
hopeful and excited manner in which he 
spoke of his impending trip with Jacob and 
the other boys (from the intro) suggests that 
faire la rentrée is nevertheless considered a 
way youth font l’aventure and the decision to 
leave is still one that is in line with the young 
migrants’ desires. Francois’ parents’ small 
home and few prized personal possessions 
suggested to me that they do without in 
order for their children to have the best 
futures possible and that procuring these 
good outcomes and migrating often go hand-
in-hand. François, by contrast, not only 
crossed national boundaries into 
Benin, he also helped minors and 
other students do so. Though these 
other students fully consented to migrating with him, asking him to show them the way, had he 
been apprehended at the border, he would have either had to pay a hefty bribe, or he would 
have incurred a fine corresponding to the articles in the 2005 Togolese Anti-Child Trafficking 
Law. If he were instead apprehended within Benin, Beninese Immigration Law might find him in 
violation for crossing the border illegally. Their low pay might have categorized this agricultural 
work a “worst form of child labor,” but it is less likely that the WFCLC would have been invoked 
as labor inspections tend to happen more often in urban areas. Further if Tani and the boys he 
was traveling with were turned back, even if no charges were filed and no bribes paid, they still 
would have wasted money on transportation and have to bear the ridicule and shame of 
returning home empty-handed (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 77). Moreover, since the motivating 
factor for the migration was to earn money for school, the boys’ schooling is now in jeopardy. 
François and Jacob cultivating in Kpagouda several weeks before leaving for Benin 
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The Dropout 
At a new village conducting interviews of past trainees for STEP Academy, my colleague 
Sanjay and I are waiting outside a tire shop in the center of town for an interviewee who 
is running very late. In the meantime, Sanjay offers to help me with my interviews with 
child migrants. On an impulse, he approaches and taps a young boy on the shoulder and 
asks him if he or any of his friends have ever worked in Surat, a city just over the border 
of southern Rajasthan into Gujarat known in this district as a common destination for 
migrants, especially young migrants working in the garment industry. The boy answers 
in the affirmative and after Sanjay explains the nature of my research and assures him 
that I was not working for the government, he agrees to speak with us.  
Currently 17 years old, the boy, nicknamed Suru, tells us that he has been working in 
Surat for four years. Suru had studied until 5th standard, but he could not seem to pass 
his exams. “School was not good. I tried my but I could not do well in my work and there 
was some conflict with the teachers.38 My good friend left for Surat the year before and 
told me that Surat is good and work there is good.” Suru tells us that his parents, 
members of the Bhil tribe, who never attended school themselves, probably wanted him 
to stay in school but that they said since he was the oldest of their 5 children, he could 
help provide for his siblings’ education instead.  
He waited until his friend, then 13 years old, returned home and Suru asked him to take 
him to Surat. His friend helped Suru come into contact with a contractor (essentially a 
recruiter of laborers) for factories in Surat and he secured employment. Before Suru left, 
his parents gave him 500rs, but the bus to Surat alone ended up costing him 300rs. We 
ask him whether he was nervous to go and he responds, “A little bit, but most of the men 
in my village work in Surat, so I did not have fear or anxiety.”  
He and his friend parted ways upon arrival and Suru was taken by his contractor to his 
new employer, a man operating a two-room wholesale shop which cuts and folds sarees 
that are then distributed and sold in retail shops all over India. Suru explains that “Each 
shop has a false ceiling of plywood—that’s where the workers cut and fold. It is a very 
congested environment. Sometimes when there were too many of us, we would work out 
on the street near the shop. Usually we would finish 2500-3000 sarees per day in groups 
of four workers.” We ask him whether there has ever been a police raid on his shop and 
he says “Yes! It only happened once to me, but from my friends in Surat I know that it is 
common…It was very scary at the time. All of the young workers hid under sarees or ran 
away!” We ask him what happens to the employer and kids that are caught and he 
explains that the employer usually pays a fine or a bribe and the kids are sometimes 
taken away and sent back to their village.  
                                                          
38 After the interview, Sanjay told me that by the way he spoke about school and his teachers, he suspected that there had 
been some level of abuse.  
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“For the first couple of months I didn’t like it very much, but then I adjusted and began to 
like it. The contractor who helped me find the job takes a lot of people from my 
community. We all lived together in rented rooms in a complex…about seven people live 
in a room. There is a common place for us all to eat and the contractor hired two cooks 
to feed us our meals.” When we ask about his work hours he replies “I worked usually 
from 11am to 11pm, with lunch from 1pm to 1:30pm. We were allowed to leave for 
festivals like Holi and Diwali and we even 
got one saree and 200 rupees as a bonus.” 
 
In the four years he worked in Surat, Suru 
tells us he worked for two different 
contracts and changed because he was 
offered a salary increase from 1,500 rs a 
month to 3,000 rs a month. Of the money 
he made, Suru kept 500rs each month for 
his “mobile charges and other expenses,” 
and the rest went to his family. We ask him 
whether he plans to continue working in 
Surat and he tells us that he wants to begin 
working “here at home as a construction 
worker” because “it was not enough money 
to survive in Surat.” 
 
Finally, we ask what he would say to other 
young kids thinking about migrating to 
Surat and he says that he would tell them 
to stay in school until 8th standard “and 
then Surat is OK because you can be hired 
as a shop assistant and make more money. 
After Surat, if you are ready, you can try for 
construction work or farm work.”  
Most migrants who do not belong in the “Student” category (migrating to earn money 
for school fees) are dropouts. Very few complete their high school education and then decide 
to migrate. The highest grade achieved by any of the migrants I interviewed was 10th grade. Few 
drop out, migrate, and return to school but it is not unheard of.  The parents of dropouts 
typically had very little education themselves and so whether their child was failing his or her 
exams or simply did not like school, many (though definitely not all) encouraged or did not 
object to the discontinuation of their child’s studies in favor of labor migration. The decision to 
abandon one’s studies in favor of migrating for employment reflects the little to nonexistent 
tangible evidence rural youth in many developing countries have of the economic returns of 
Suru on the outskirts of his village 
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education. To many families, it becomes a waste of time and money39 given their financial 
circumstances. Family poverty or the death, sickness, or retirement of a parent are also some of 
the factors affecting dropouts.  
              Pass hua toh zindabad. Fail hua toh Ahmedabad. People in Gurutaraj kept referencing 
this rhyme in regards to the intersection between education and child migration. Roughly 
translated it means, “If I pass, I’ll study forever. If I fail, I’ll go to Ahmedabad.” This mentality 
shows both the desire to be educated and how easy it is for students in rural public schools to 
fall behind in their studies. ST families especially expressed a strong desire for their children to 
go to school, but claimed that their family’s economic situation made this impossible. “First you 
must fill your belly. And the bellies of your brothers and sisters, if possible. Then you can 
study.” 
               Falling behind in school, failing exams, and dissatisfaction with the quality of education 
in general were major factors in the decision to migrate for 9/18 of my interviewees in 
Gurutaraj. These sentiments were mostly expressed by tribal families and migrants. A few 
Rajput migrants told me that school was going very well for them when they dropped out, but 
that they did not have the luxury of furthering their education as their families were in debt or 
in an otherwise difficult financial situation.  
                The school in Gurutaraj accommodates grades 1-10 and has only five teachers. Even 
with several combined-grade-level classes, there simply are not enough instructors to teach all 
of the students at once. Thus, some classes are instructed to “study independently” for large 
portions of the school day, or even for the whole day. With such large classroom sizes (some as 
big as 70 students) and so few teachers, many young children are getting increasingly 
discouraged and disenchanted with education, preferring to “be productive for their families” 
rather than unproductive at school. Further, in an area with so few employment opportunities, 
the economic returns of education are not so tangibly apparent, and thus not a powerful force 
in deterring dropouts.  
 For Suru, poor education quality, the example of the friend one year his senior, the fact 
that he has several younger siblings who will need money for education and other expenses, 
and potentially (though not explicitly) family poverty all converged to influence his decision to 
migrate. Out of school at the young age of 12, Suru’s physical limitations seemed to have kept 
local construction out of reach for the time being, and so Surat became the second-best option 
as it is the closest major hub for migrant workers from southern Rajasthan and because it has a 
thriving textile industry, an informal sector in which employers have few qualms about hiring 
young kids (Khare 2013). This particular case also includes a rare instance of recommending 
further education because it would increase one’s salary. This suggests that Suru might have 
made a different choice (perhaps stayed in school until 8th grade) if he had had complete 
                                                          
39 School fees in both India and Togo are prohibitive, have to buy uniform, shoes and books (in addition to paying tuition) or 
you can’t go. Driver of dropouts and child migration. The requirement of school fees, even for public education can be ascribed 
to the effects of SAPs and the reduction of government spending on such social services (Explored in section 3.5).  
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information about his choices, but nonetheless it is clear that three years later he probably still 
would have migrated. 
 In terms of vulnerability, Suru might have been at higher risk than some of the previous 
migrants because he traveled with a contractor, an intermediary who was previously unknown 
to him. Evidence40 I gathered from my interviews in India comparing work conditions and initial 
salary with type of intermediary suggests that the less personally one knows his or her 
intermediary, the more at risk they are of being cheated or exploited in some way. This, as I 
mentioned in the Introduction, is true for wagas in Togo as well. Even so, this particular 
contractor seems to have recruited heavily from Suru’s community, so people might have been 
able to vouch for his moral character. Further, he was separated from his friend at destination, 
but the contractor made sure he lived with others from his community. Relative to some of the 
other profiles, Suru seems to have exercised particularly thin agency. 
Although Suru only crossed state lines, had his contractor been apprehended by law 
enforcement, the Palermo Protocol41 might have been invoked because he is underage and the 
work he does in Surat is rather unambiguously exploitative. His consent is of no consequence. 
Under the WFCLC and its national version, raids and inspections do seem to occur in the textile 
market, but Suru’s account of the one raid he experienced suggests that he was more scared of 
the police than anything--with kids running and hiding--hardly a scene of “rescue.” Of course, 
he does not say whether his employers were telling them all to run and hide, or whether this 
was their instinct. Perhaps they themselves did not want to be identified and sent home to 
their villages.  Suru was also partially affected by the age of compulsory education. Given that 
he dropped out of school after 5th standard, when one is about 12 years old, under the 2006 
updated Indian Child Labor it would be illegal for him to be employed in any type of work. At 
age 14 his legal options are still limited to “soft labor.”  
The Adventurer 
Kouwenam, one of the village’s meneusiers, or carpenters, comes over to my homestead 
one day to fix the lock on the door to my room. When I ask him where he learned this 
trade, for which he is known in Kpagouda, he responds “Nigeria. The second time” and 
so begins our informal interview. He tells me, “the first time I ‘went on adventure’ I was 
16 and I went with a small group of kids to the South of Togo, near the Ghanaian border, 
to cultivate yams and maiz for about six months for some Kabre there.” The next time he 
migrated for work, however, was to Benin at age 18 “because the South of Togo is a bit 
poor” and he could make more money in Benin, 7,000CFA for a carré42, as opposed to 
only 6,000CFA in the South.  
                                                          
40 Figure 7 in in Appendix  
41 Or the national version of it, the new Criminal Law Amendments Act of 2013 (“India” 2013). 
42 ¼ hectare. Measures 25 meters squared.  
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He tells me that to get to Benin, he and another group of boys he was leading this time 
walked to the Togolese/Beninese border43 and from there took a hired taxi to the city of 
Djougou. When I ask him whether he has ever encountered any difficulties at the border, 
he laughs and says “No, no. it is very easy to use bush roads to get past the border 
police, but if they catch you, it’s nothing a bribe cannot fix….”  
Kouwenam and the other boys’ journey to Benin took about one day and cost a total of 
2,500CFA, which the family that employed them to cultivate their fields paid on their 
behalf. Of this family he says, “In Benin I formed a close relationship with the family I 
was working for. They were Logba44and very good and in Benin they feed you and house 
you without taking from your payments…I made between 160,000 CFA and 200,000 CFA 
in the six months. Yes, Benin is very good. On peut se debrouiller45” (Hashim and 
Thorsten 2011, 125-126). 
When I ask about Nigeria, on the other hand, he says that “the work there is very 
difficult. Wagas from Nigeria usually put you with Chocosi46 families and we have to 
build our own shelters out in the fields, even cook for ourselves after the long days of 
cultivating…I like Benin more, but one has to take opportunities as they come. I was 
young and I also wanted to see Nigeria.”  
In total, Kouwenam had migrated to southern Togo for work four times, to Benin more 
than three times, and to Nigeria twice. In a follow-up interview conducted by Professor 
Charles Piot, we discover 
what another big motivation 
behind all of this labor was. 
Kouwenam was asked “why 
are young people so 
addicted to l’aventure?” He 
responded that “The impulse 
comes from within. Maybe 
you want to construct a 
home here, but you don’t 
have money. I wanted to get 
married too.” Piot expands 
on this and explains to us 
that young men in this 
society “need bridewealth in 
order to marry. One has to by 
                                                          
43 The border is only 18 km away from Kpagouda, following the road to the nearby town of Kutao and to the official border 
crossing station, and about 12 km away if one takes a direct route on foot to avoid the border authorities, as many migrants do. 
44 Of the Logba ethnic group, so they spoke Kabiyè like Kouwenam and the other boys. 
45 Roughly, one can manage or get by. (Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 125-126) 
46 Primarily Muslim, Yoruba-speaking ethnic group in southwest Nigeria. Near the city of Kisi 
Kouwenam and the children of the family for whom he worked in Benin 
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palm oil, sulum47, baobab seeds, European beer, corn, give money, or some combination 
thereof.” Kouwenam worked hard to get enough money to buy building materials to 
build a house and attract the woman that is now his wife. At the time of this interview, 
their first child was not yet a year old. Kouwenam said, “People used to go and stay in 
the South. Now they go to Nigeria or Benin and try to build a life here. I can work here 
and provide for my family now with the carpentering I learned in Nigeria.” 
The adventurer is similar to the runaway, but with potentially different motivations, 
intergenerational relationships, and levels of community acceptance. Typically the decision to 
migrate for the adventurer aligns with the individual’s desire to travel and have new 
experiences, but also the social value of the act of migration itself—as a coming-of-age 
statement, or as a strategy to accumulate wealth, and thus, luxury items to showcase and gain 
status from, along with one’s newfound knowledge of the world. The adventurer, more so than 
the runaway, usually intends to return to his or her village.  
 In India, there were many legacies, and as I have said, Gurutaraj and southern 
Rajasthan in general had a high rate and longstanding tradition of circular labor migration, at 
least among males. This has normalized labor migration to an extent, so even if children do run 
away, this might be devastating at the familial level, but the community might not be moved 
one way or the other, taking it as a fact of life and assuming the boy will return sooner or later 
to start a life in the village. In Togo, however, traditional migration, as I explained in the 
introduction, was always from northern to southern Togo, but the new popular destinations to 
Benin and Nigeria have elicited heated responses from adults and other leaders in the 
community. Parents I interviewed protested that this younger generation only cared about 
making quick money and buying flashy things like motorcycles, cell phones, and new sound 
systems. Fearing the unknown and fearing for the safety of their children abroad, they asserted 
that it is better for one to stay and cultivate in Kpagouda, or to make money in nearby towns—
“even though it is not as much as one could make in Benin or Nigeria, it is enough to faire la 
rentrée,” one mother told me. Another parent conceded that employment nearby is hard to 
come by, and that if one can earn more abroad and if there is no money for school if the child 
does not go earn, it is hard to deny youth the opportunity. The village chief blamed the youth 
for foolishly leaving to chase an illusion of l’aventure. He said that more often than not they 
returned empty-handed to a village less able to feed them than when they left (because their 
families suddenly lacked their labor power). Each migrant, parent, village leader, and NGO 
worker has his or her own opinion of youth migration, colored by the narratives that have 
directly touched their lives, and it’s hard to tell whether this new phenomenon of international 
migration has been mostly beneficial or mostly detrimental to the community and families 
involved, especially with a discourse so indicative of a generation divide. 
L’aventure is a powerful motivator. Young men and women dream of returning home 
with tin for their family’s roofs, electronics, and other indicators of social wealth. The allure of 
                                                          
47 The local sorghum beer 
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l’aventure goes back to the allure of the modern, of technology, of life outside the small village 
these youth call home. Leaving for Nigeria carries the connotation that one will see the world, 
learn new languages, experience different culture, and perhaps touch modernity if working in a 
bigger town or city, “[when you migrate outside of Togo] you have seen more of the world and 
might even be able to speak another language! Others come to respect you.” Such sentiments 
were expressed by migrants in India as well. One in particular said, “People admire those who 
go to Surat, they come back and their whole demeanor is different, their clothes, the way the 
walk, the way they talk. It’s enticing.” This anecdotal evidence suggests that apart from the 
material wealth ideally accumulated through labor migration, the act migration itself has 
tremendous social value, which has proven to be another source of motivation.  
 Though I did not gain an insight into Kouwenam’s original motivations for migration at 
age 16, or whether this decision was made with or without his parents, he showed agency not 
only through choice, but through strategy. He seemed to have gained experience migrating to 
the south and to Benin with groups of other boys from the village, even leading a few. Working 
with wagas, one always runs the risk of being cheated out of one’s fair wages. And even though 
at one point he ended up in Nigeria despite its reputation of rough conditions and back-
breaking labor because one has to “take opportunities as they come,” indicating constrained 
agency, he ended up making enough money to finance an apprenticeship. His accumulated 
wealth allowed him to build a home in the village and attract his wife, and his new skill enables 
him to work locally and make a decent living. 
Kouwenam’s legal considerations are very similar to those of François. As he was around 
16-18 years old when he first migrated and first migrated out of the country, the difference 
between “victim of trafficking” under the Palermo Protocol and “trafficker of children” hung 
precariously close. Further, the illegality of the movement of minors for the purpose of 
employment that is deemed exploitative necessitates evading normal channels of migration, 
forcing Kouwenam and the other boys to travel through potentially dangerous “bush roads.” 
Kouwenam also mentions that the family that ends up employing him usually pays for 
transportation on his behalf. If your ability to pay for transportation necessitates reaching 
destination and you get turned back, you may have a serious issue with the moto or taxi you 
hired and these confrontations always have the potential to turn violent. This shows that in the 
name of protecting child migrants from what lies ahead of them, they are turned back and 
sometimes that itself puts them at risk for other types of abuses. 
The Girl  
“Kafara? Anyone home?” Jesper, my translator, and I had come to a homestead near the 
center of Kpagouda to interview a young woman named Chilalo. Unlike in India, in Togo 
the results of the household survey I conducted showed that girls were migrating in near 
equal number as boys from this village, but they work very different jobs at destination. 
Instead of primarily cultivation, young girls who leave their villages in Togo often work 
as domestic servants or bonage, at small shops, or in bars. Because work in bars in some 
cases has led to selling sex for extra money, it seemed that most girls were wary about 
talking about their migratory experiences at all, even if they hadn’t worked in bars. We 
hoped that Chilalo might feel comfortable enough to speak candidly with us.  
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We spot the corner of a green and blue pagne48 move behind the curtain covering the 
otherwise open doorway and soon Chilalo emerged with a baby on her hip. She smiled 
coyly and led us into the courtyard, which was completely shaded from the sun by an 
enormous mango tree. We sit on a bench at the base of the tree and ask her if she would 
be willing to share her experience with us or comment on girls’ migration from 
Kpagouda in general.  
 
She starts by telling us about two friends of hers who both dropped out of school 
because they could no longer pay for their studies. The first, recently orphaned, left for 
Benin at 15 years old and has been working there for two years as a barmaid. Chilalo 
tells us that “her plan was to make enough money to pay for an apprenticeship and then 
move back here.” The second friend is currently 17 years old, like Chilalo, and has been 
working in Benin for just under a year selling food in small restaurants and on the road.  
 
As for her own experience, Chilalo told us that she first left for Benin when she was 16. 
“My father had just passed away and there was no one to provide for the family, so I 
decided to leave my studies to go get money for my younger brother and sister’s 
education.” She met a “grande soeur49” who was recruiting girls for domestic work in 
Benin and secured a job. The soeur paid for transportation for Chilalo and one other girl 
who made the journey with her, but the two ended up working in different houses.  
 
She began working in the household of two civil servants with two children. “From 5am 
to 12pm I would do the dishes, sweep, prepare breakfast for the family, and get the 
children ready for school by bathing them. Around 4pm I would bring the children home 
from school, make the family dinner, and go to sleep around 9pm. “Work was very 
difficult. I could have stayed another year, but I do not think that I could have negotiated 
a higher wage.” The soeur had pre-negotiated her salary of 10,000CFA ($21 USD) a 
month, so Chilalo tells us that she did not know at the time if she took a cut of her pay or 
not. She tells us that later on she found out that other domestic workers were making 
15,000CFA or more. The family provided food, but toiletries and any other personal items 
she had to buy with her salary, but what she had left over she would send back in the 
form of cash or notebooks and other school supplies with people she knew who were 
returning to Kpagouda or nearby village.  
 
In the time that she has been back, Chilalo got married and had a child. Her husband is 
currently in Nigeria working as a cultivator for a Muslim family there. As far as her plans 
for the future, she tells us that she “would like to resume her studies next year when her 
son is a little bit older and her husband comes back.  
 
                                                          
48 A traditional patterned cloth used as skirts and other things. 
49 Translates to “big sister” 
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Female migrants are 
particularly constrained by 
gender norms. Ideas about 
what kind of work is proper for 
a female to do, or not, means 
that there are very different 
employment options available 
to girls. In Rajasthan women 
might only migrate to nearby 
Kherlumbar for day labor and in 
Kpagouda girls are limited to 
certain jobs like domestic labor. 
Females are under-represented 
in these profiles for several 
reasons. In India, as I have 
mentioned, I did not identify a 
single female who had migrated 
out of state. This is partially 
because female autonomy is 
especially restricted in a more 
conservative state like 
Rajasthan. In Togo, at first it 
seemed to me that I was only 
finding male migrants because many more boys were migrating than girls, but as Chilalo and 
her friends and François and his sisters indicate, boys and girls migrate in close to equal 
numbers from Kpagouda—perhaps with slightly more male migrants. The reason it seems as if 
fewer girls leave the village to work in Benin and Nigeria is because the nature of the work they 
fall into at destination is very different from the work that boys do, and often has a negative 
connotation, so it is not widely spoken about.   
 The men in this region of northern Togo are some of the best cultivators in the country. 
Their skills (and cheap labor) are in high demand in Benin and Nigeria, and cultivation is by far 
the most common sector of employment for male migrants there, though some may also 
migrate to begin an apprenticeship in a trade such as carpentry. Since these young men also 
cultivate for their families and for their community when they are at home in Kpagouda, this 
type of work is part of the landscape, part of their history, and part of the village community. 
Thus, the work they do abroad is frequently discussed as they and their elders compare the soil 
conditions, techniques, tools, and so on to those of Kpagouda. 
 By contrast, girls end up either working in bars or working in households as domestic 
servants, with the majority (roughly 60%) ending up in bars, a job not at all common for a 
female in Kpagouda. There are other possibilities, such as working as a phone booth operator 
Chilalo (far left) and a few of the other migrant girls I interviewed in Togo 
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or working in a boutique50, but often these migrant women have little say in their work 
placement, especially if they have a “bad” or self-interested waga who only wants to make 
money off of their labor.  
 Work as a barmaid often turns into sex work after hours. A girl’s employer can threaten 
to kick her out if she does not sleep with him or his customers. In Nigeria this would mean being 
alone in an unfamiliar country, facing a language barrier and having no means of getting back, 
so she has little choice. The sad truth about sex labor is known and heavily stigmatized back in 
the village, meaning that few girls are comfortable talking about their experiences, especially 
since some are rumored to have been infected with HIV/AIDS while abroad.   
 Girls are more likely to work spread out in different bars or houses even if they are 
recruited together. Work conditions in homes are not typically dangerous, but the girls might 
experience verbal or physical abuse, almost always work unfairly long hours, and the labor is 
very arduous—they cook for all members of the family, clean, tend to children, run errands, 
and more. 
 In bars the work is a little bit more dangerous, but the hours are a little bit shorter, 
depending on the informal sex work done after hours. Bars are also more profitable because 
the sex work adds “tips” to a salary already comparable to domestic labor. Girls predominantly 
go to Benin, though many go to Nigeria. Girls in both Benin and Nigeria are paid in cash each 
month, but they might also bring back goods like pagnes, dishware, and other household 
goods. A girl working in a home might receive 10,000-20,000 CFA ($21-$42 USD) a month while 
a girl working in a bar would receive at least 15,000CFA a month plus tips.  
 Although it was Chilalo’s decision to migrate, it was a decision heavily influenced by the 
death of her father and the idea that it was her duty as the eldest to provide for her younger 
siblings, or the family would risk falling deeply into poverty. As far as vulnerability, she was at 
the mercy of a soeur who may not have placed her in a bar, but may have cheated her out of a 
fair wage.  Chilalo was able to finance the schooling of her brother and sister, but she must now 
find a way to make ends meet while her husband is away and has to bear the stigma of a girl 
who migrated, a girl who may be lying about working as a domestic servant because she wants 
to cover up her sex work. Chilalo definitely exhibits “thin” or constrained agency. 
Households, like farms, are unlikely to be inspected for underage or mistreated 
domestic servants, so the chances of Chilalo being affected by a raid in the name of the WFCLC 
or the national child labor laws were very slim. However, with the death of her father, her 
family and younger siblings especially needed her added income. If she and the soeur were 
caught trying to cross the border into Benin and turned back, it is likely that Chilalo would have 
tried to migrate again soon after, perhaps more desperate and more willing to accept any 
employment, even as a barmaid.  
 
                                                          
50 Boutiques look a lot like bars, but sell no alcohol.  
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2.6 Why Acknowledge “Thin” Agency? 
At the end of the discussion of each profile, aligning legal instruments like the CRC, the 
WFCLC and the Palermo Protocol examined in Chapter 1 with the realities of individuals they 
implicate should again call into question normative understandings of childhood and labor. 
These six migrants came from very different circumstances. Their agency was constrained to 
varying degrees, they were vulnerable to varying degrees, and not all were great “success”’ 
stories (as shown in Table 1). However, my argument is not that child migration invariably yields 
great success. These six stories are meant to illustrate how the policies currently in place would 
not help kids in these positions, but rather leave them unchanged or worse-off.  
Migrant Profiles, Agency, and the Law 
                                                          
51 I applied a proxy measure of agency I devised in India (see Table 2 in Appendix) that considers age of first 
migration, highest level of education completed, whether the parents knew he or she was migrating, whose 
decision the migration was, and what type of intermediary, to each migrant. Clearly this method cannot provide 
statistically accurate data, especially with a small sample size, but even if agency is not easily measured, these 
indicators can be used to rank these child migrants in terms of agency and at the very least compare them to each 
other.  
52 This designation came from a combination of the migrant’s economic situation post migration (whether salary 
went up or down, whether they were able to save, and whether they were able to pay for something as a direct 
result of money made through migration) and the migrant’s personal satisfaction with his or her situation post-
migration as compared to pre-migration (Was a goal accomplished, such as paying for school or a wedding? Was 
there a valuable experience had—adventure, mentoring, camaraderie?).  
Name “Type” of 
Migrant 
Factors at Play Agency 
Rank51 
Pertinent Laws Laws Invoked? Outcome of 
Migration52 
Abhimanyu The 
Runaway 
Inter-generational 
conflict, Low 
agricultural 
productivity 
1 WFCLC, 2006 
Indian Child 
Labor Ban, 
Palermo Protocol 
None Favorable 
Tejpal The Legacy Retirement of 
breadwinner, Pride, 
Duty, Expectation, 
Bridewealth 
3 Palermo Protocol None Neutral to 
Favorable 
François The Student Cost of Education, 
family poverty 
4 WFCLC, Palermo 
Protocol, 2005 
Togolese Child 
Trafficking Law, 
Beninese 
Immigration Law 
None  Favorable 
Suru The Dropout Poor quality of 
education, birth order, 
family poverty, peer 
example, few 
accessible local 
employment 
opportunities, lack of 
information 
5 WFCLC, 2006 
Indian Child 
Labor Ban, Age of 
Compulsory 
Education, 
Palermo 
Protocol. 
2006 Indian 
Child Labor 
Ban (prompted 
a police raid of 
his place of 
employment, 
but he was not 
taken away.) 
Unfavorable 
to Neutral 
Kouwenam The 
Adventurer 
Social value of 
migration, 
bridewealth, few local 
employment 
opportunities 
2 WFCLC, Palermo 
Protocol, 2005 
Togolese Child 
Trafficking Law 
None Favorable 
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 The laws, if invoked directly, would have mislabeled several of these child migrants as 
victims of trafficking and child labor, even if they sought out employment out of their own 
volition and/or necessity. In most cases these legal instruments meant to protect the child 
would have done these particular migrants more harm than good—imposing financial, social, 
and psychological costs. There is the loss of employment and the dilemma of finding a new job 
that Suru might have faced had he been caught in the raid. The illegality of both movement and 
employment, if enforced, would have put many of these children in worse situations because 
border police might then demand heftier bribes of students like François or more dangerous 
routes would have been necessary to avoid them. Even less honest intermediaries than 
Chilalo’s would be the ones willing to take the risk of transporting minors against the law 
(Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 78). 
Although Table 1 might suggest that agency is correlated with more favorable 
outcomes, this method is far from a precise measure of agency or success, both of which are 
highly subjective concepts. Even taking a seemingly less biased indicator of success, such as 
salary at destination, one can see in the scatter plot (Figure 8 in Appendix) that salary was not 
positively correlated with the migrant’s agency “score” in the study I conducted. 
All six child migrants examined in the profiles chose to migrate, though their reasoning 
and motivations differed. However, given that the agency of a majority of these was 
characterized by at least a small measure of structural constraint, why should we acknowledge 
this “thin” agency at all? Since these children are making decisions that have the potential to 
harm them in various ways and end in unfavorable outcomes, doesn’t society face a moral 
imperative to protect them from themselves? Faced with this ethical dilemma, Glover contends 
that utilitarian arguments that rely on the fact that a choice has been made and maintain that 
that is sufficient “may not be valid if one is to adopt a moral stance” (Glover 1995, 123; cited in 
Hashim and Thorsen 2011, 118). Essentially the question becomes, if these children are 
consenting to exploitation, can considering their free will be morally justified?  
To fail to do this, to disregard and undermine the agency, however thin, that child 
migrants have managed to carve out for themselves in the face of tremendous adversity would 
amount to a double-victimization, a new manifestation of structural violence. After all, “it is 
very difficult to prescribe whether or not a choice as a ‘good one’, since any assessment of 
individuals’ choices necessarily entails bringing in an alternative normative standpoint, a set of 
values other than the child’s. A key question, then, is to what extent does this normative 
standpoint express values that are relevant to the reality it seeks to evaluate” (Kabeer 1999, 
458)?  In other words, the child’s own personal values must be consulted before it is decided 
whether a choice is “good” or in his or her best interest.  
Chilalo The Girl Death of breadwinner, 
birth order, family 
poverty, gender norms 
6 WFCLC, Palermo 
Protocol, 2005 
Togolese Child 
Trafficking Law 
None Unfavorable 
to Neutral 
Table 1 
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Policymakers, child-rights activists, researchers, and other relevant actors and 
institutions are faced with a paradox—a population they have a responsibility to that is to 
varying degrees vulnerable to exploitation and to varying degrees autonomous and resilient. 
Policy in particular must grapple with the question of whether to protect or support these child 
migrants. The longstanding propensity for protection privileges the notion of the “best interest 
of the child” over the child’s “participatory rights,” two provisions of the CRC that often come 
into conflict. “Other criticisms of the CRC are that it has trivialized certain rights” such as the 
child’s right to empowerment in favor of “the entitlement to government protection and 
services” (Ansell 2005; Ennew et al. 2005). I maintain that the child should be empowered to 
make this choice between which of his or her rights he or she would like to give more weight to, 
given his or her personal circumstances, and I advocate for a theoretical and policy shift toward 
the support rather than strictly the protection of child migrants.  
To accomplish this, policymakers need to consider the possibility of children’s agency, 
even if it exists in tandem with different levels of vulnerability that must also be addressed. 
Who are the current policymakers or policymaking entities? At what levels do they operate? 
What are their current strategies and how can they create effective policy that is nuanced 
enough to address the blurred lines of “thin” agency?  
To address these questions, in Chapter 3 I will turn from the three main international 
conventions I introduced in Chapter 1 and applied in Chapter 2. I will instead highlight the most 
commonly used interventions to child labor and child trafficking, borne of the aforementioned 
laws and implemented by national governments, non-governmental groups, and occasionally 
local people. I will explore the underlying reasons why each type of existing intervention largely 
fails to benefit independent migrant children, drawing a parallel from the development of these 
children to the “development” of the low-income countries they are predominantly found in. I 
will reference several historical examples in which Western reactions to perceived human rights 
abuses and top-down “solutions” to poverty, much like top-down “solutions” to child labor and 
child trafficking, have produced at best ineffective and at worst disastrous results. Finally, I will 
discuss the importance of grassroots, bottom-up movements as an alternative that privilege 
local knowledge and are supported, but not influenced (passively or actively) by outside forces. 
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Chapter 3: Critical Policy Review- Existing Interventions 
and the importance of local knowledge 
 The WFCLC, the CRC, the Palermo Protocol, and other international legislation may 
seem far removed from the lives of migrant children at the local or village level, but the effects 
of these laws and the ideas they impose can nevertheless be felt at every level of global 
society53. Designed at the highest level by the leaders of the UN, ILO, UNDP, IOM and other 
IGOs, these laws in turn influenced national and regional policy, putting pressure on local 
governments to change their official age of compulsory education, child labor laws, child 
trafficking legislation,54 the age of majority,55 and other legal standards.  At the level of NGOs, 
many organizations, even if they are operated entirely by local people (as Aajeevika Bureau is), 
require foreign financial backing and often must succumb (to some degree) to foreign agendas 
in order to receive this financial support.56 Alternatively, these organizations might purposely or 
inadvertently propagate Western ideals through “awareness campaigns” in cases where they 
are run by the local elite who may be Western-educated. Descending one more level it would 
seem that there are few to no true “bottom-up” grassroots efforts that conceive and carry out 
independent interventions relating to child migration. Thus, the normative ideas that frame 
even international statutes penned in Geneva can trickle down to the meso and micro levels of 
regional and local policy in countries such as Togo and India, prompting the implementation of 
certain types of preconceived, pre-packaged interventions that are often not a good fit for 
independent child migrants.  
3.1 Existing Interventions 
By analyzing primary documents detailing anti-TIP efforts in other countries through the 
lens of the U.S. Department of State (US Embassy Cables), by reviewing numerous IGO reports 
on the policies of different countries’ strategies at the national, NGO, and village/local levels 
(Measures to Combat Trafficking 2006), and through my own  fieldwork experience I have 
identified the following as the main policies and intervention strategies employed to combat 
trafficking of children and child labor, separated by stage in the migration cycle. Almost none of 
these are supportive measures that would help independent child migrants on their journeys. 
Instead, these policies are all based on interdiction by law, reducing the number of mobile 
youth by engaging them or their families directly (“raising awareness” and offering alternatives 
like rural employment, education, and skills-training), the reduction of mobile youth by 
galvanizing and training people to stop them (police and village committees), and finally the 
reversal of youth mobility through repatriation and reintegration. I will now explore each of 
                                                          
53 See examples in section 1.4.  
54 Sovereign states such as Malaysia bowed unwillingly to pressure from the US TIP Program and passed new anti-
trafficking legislation, as I detailed in a subsection of 1.4- “The U.S. TIP Report.” 
55 A reference to section 1.2, in which Namibia felt compelled to “harmonize” its laws with the international 
standards of the CRC. 
56 A reference to a subsection of 1.4- “Funding Politics and Local Actors” in which my supervisor at Aajeevika 
Bureau tells me the Bureau’s reason for not training children under age 18. 
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these strategies in sections separated into government interventions, NGO and IGO 
interventions, joint interventions, and grassroots movements.  
 
 
3.2 Top-down Government Interventions 
Rural Employment Schemes 
We have already addressed the laws of interdiction in the two previous chapters, so the 
next type of common government intervention is rural employment schemes. Due to low 
agricultural productivity, caused in part by climate change, a scarcity of sustainable local 
employment, and because small rural villages have thus virtually emptied except for the very 
young and the very old, one major pre-migration strategy national governments have employed 
is rural employment schemes. The foremost example57 exists in India and is called the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Instituted in September 2005, 
this program has been praised for its success in providing “for the enhancement of livelihood 
security of the households in rural areas of the country by providing at least one hundred days 
of guaranteed wage employment in every financial year to every household” under a rights-
based framework (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 2009, 7).  
While it is true that MGNREGA has “augmented employment, increased family income, 
included marginalized groups, and stemmed distress migration” to an extent, there are a few 
reasons why it has not significantly impacted youth migration (International Policy Centre for 
Inclusive Growth 2009, 11-23). First, from the migrants I interviewed in Kherlumbar Block, it 
was apparent that even eight years after the MGNREGA went into effect it had not reached 
everyone who needed it. One migrant man who had returned to the village from Ahmedabad 
told me that there is “No MGNREGA here. I know about it but there have not been any projects 
starting for two years. And the pay is not enough at all.” Indeed, MGNREGA guarantees 100 
                                                          
57 In terms of the number of beneficiaries, MGNREGA is also the “largest and most ambitious social security, public 
works,” and rural employment guarantee program in the world (Ministry of Rural Development 2005).  
Common Intervention Strategies 
Figure 4 
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days of employment per household. As a result, people in the village say that “young people are 
still going to Ahmedabad for work. It is women and old men who work MGNREGA projects in 
the village.” Further, even if the youth did want to stay and work MGNREGA projects, perhaps 
while continuing their education, no one under the age of 18 is permitted to work on these 
projects. Lastly, although the program was set up to be transparent, it has nevertheless been 
plagued by corruption, and the meager salaries that might have been earned by villagers 
involved in these government projects like building bridges and roads instead have lined the 
pockets of the middlemen and project supervisors (“Reported Corruption in MGNREGA”).  
  
Police Training 
 In order to stop youth and their intermediaries before they cross borders or reach 
destination, governments combatting TIP worldwide have been encouraged to allocate funds 
for training law enforcement officials to identify trafficked children and take appropriate action. 
There is evidence to suggest, however, that this training is often of poor quality, poorly funded, 
or both. From Mozambique, one embassy cable mentions that, “Enforcement remedies 
generally are adequate in the formal sectors, but remain poor in the regulation of informal child 
labor. The Labor Inspectorate and police force lack adequate staff, funds, and training to 
investigate child labor cases, especially in areas outside the capital, where many cases 
occur…there is no specialized child labor training for the Labor Inspectorate” (Embassy Maputo 
2009, 09MAPUTO41). Even so, Leigh Campoamor’s dissertation on child street laborers in Peru 
indicates that even when there is specialized child labor training given to local authorities, 
pressure from NGOs aiming to eradicate child labor in this particular context led to labor 
monitors patrolling the streets for hawkers when their training was designed for factory raids 
(Campoamor 2012).  
Similar accounts point out that police have not been given adequate training to be able 
to identify victims of trafficking and child labor. It is hard to imagine a way in which the 
situation with police and labor inspectorates in these low-income countries would benefit 
independent child migrants. Because law enforcement officials are not equipped to properly 
handle cases that involve children and the informal sector, it is likely that even if they did 
manage a formal inspection of the informal labor sector, a raid, or an attempt at repatriation, 
the child would likely not get linked to the resources he or she would need. He or she would 
simply be out of a job, perhaps far from home. Lastly, even if sufficient funds were allocated to 
quality training, it is doubtful that police would be trained in a way that would allow for the 
consideration independent child migrants. It is more likely that they would be told to treat 
every child as a victim or potential victim. 
 The quality of law enforcement when it comes to cases of child labor and child 
trafficking is further affected by corruption, and from experience I can say that the way it 
“plagues the police and gendarmes” is not unique to Madagascar (Embassy Antananarivo 2007, 
07ANTANANARIVO161). On our way to Benin from Kpagouda with Kouwenam as our guide, we 
got to see the corruption of border officials first-hand. Everyone except Kouwenam had visas 
and the proper paperwork to cross the border, but it turned out to be nothing a 500CFA bribe 
couldn’t fix, for Kouwenam cheerfully rejoined our group five minutes later on the other side.  
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Raids, Repatriation, & Shelters 
 At destination, government interventions turn to primarily raids of employers suspected 
of hiring child labor and subsequent repatriation.  It is not uncommon for “rescued” victims to 
be left “even more destitute” because they are left without employment (Embassy 
Antananarivo 2008, 08ANTANANARIVO440). National geographic reported on an updated 
Indian child labor law in 2006 which banned most forms of “soft labor” that had previously 
been left out of such regulations ("Child Labor Banned in India" 2010). A photographer captures 
a shot of a weeping seven-year-old named Salaj Mohammed Kasim during a raid on a Mumbai 
embroidery workshop and the reporter states that “many children are worried about the 
financial implications of the law…the 80 rupees (about U.S. $2) that a child working in the city 
may make in a day can be crucial to the survival of the family back home.” This was the case for 
one child that was interviewed, Rama Chandran, 13, who “sends money home to his widowed 
mother and three younger siblings. He says ‘if I didn’t send money home, they would starve’” 
("Child Labor Banned in India" 2010). Raids might, in theory, be the appropriate action for 
young children like Chandran who are clearly under enormous agentive constraints, even if he 
is working willingly, but “social workers caution that sufficient safeguards have not been put in 
place to protect children who could find themselves homeless as a result of the new law” 
(ibid.). Without the proper infrastructure for reintegration of the child migrant backing the law, 
including measures that would address his or her reasons for migrating and working in the first 
place, interventions like employer raids of little use and might do more harm than good. Suru’s 
story of his experience in a raid and the experiences of others in that textile market in Mumbai 
exhibit how police and inspectors in this capacity are also prone to corruption, often taking 
bribes in exchange for “tips” to employers of underage workers about when there will be a raid.  
Not enough focus is placed on the sending regions, the places that export child laborers, 
or on identifying and addressing the community characteristics that fuel this phenomenon. This 
may be because offices of labor inspection typically already exist for the formal labor sector, so 
it is a matter of giving additional training to current employees, while a whole new agency 
might need to be created to explore the sources of child labor, a much more expensive and 
complicated process, especially when there is any kind of political inertia. 
In all, top-down government interventions, including simply passing laws that make 
child trafficking and child labor illegal, often fail because they do not take into account 
children’s agency, their specific circumstances, or their reasons for migrating. Some of these 
things are not done because certain government agencies are under-funded and/or not well-
coordinated with others that might have competing jurisdiction.   
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3.3 NGO/IGO Interventions 
 
Raising Awareness/Changing attitudes  
In addition to many joint interventions which I will highlight in the next section, NGOs 
like Terre des Hommes, Care International, Anti-Slavery International, religious organizations 
such as International Catholic Bureau for Children and IGOs like UNICEF, IOM, and UNDP often 
sponsor campaigns to “raise awareness” in communities about the perils of child trafficking and 
child labor, among other issues like health, education, and gender equality. In theory, it is good 
that these groups are engaging local communities, but when the main themes turn out to be 
“don’t sell your children,” this relationship can become problematic (Embassy Antananarivo 
2007, 07ANTANANARIVO557). Especially in West Africa, where the practice of fostering and 
these “fluid families” are widespread, Western organizations looking into child trafficking 
adopted the stance that uninformed or negligent parents were unintentionally selling their 
children to traffickers thinking that they were sending them to live with relatives elsewhere. 
The core message of these “sustained sensitization programs” that was spread is that “parents 
must learn to be responsible for children until they are adults and to get away from the idea 
that sending them to the ‘Big City’ will lead to their better future” (Embassy Abuja 2003, 
03ABUJA515). Again, while it is a good sign that these organizations are in dialogue with local 
communities, these “awareness-raising” campaigns risk offending communities by suggesting 
that traditional practices like fostering are bad and/or that parents are completely naïve or 
complicit to the sale of their own children (ibid.).  
In short, the major pitfall of this type of intervention is that it is simplistic and often 
blames these communities for allowing something to happen without considering the structural 
issues in place that produce these outcomes. “Government and international TIP programs that 
focus on awareness-raising initiatives,” though potentially effective in the short term, have little 
long-term benefit because they are “not accompanied by parallel efforts to address the root of 
the problem—the lack of economic alternatives” (Embassy Antananarivo 2007, 
07ANTANANARIVO161). Local leaders in Madagascar pointed out that “Everyone has had 
awareness-raising. Plenty of NGOs have been doing that. At this point we need economic 
alternatives even more…these campaigns and even initiatives to root out corruption will go 
nowhere if residents continue to struggle to make ends meet every day” (ibid.). Even if a 
campaign is culturally sensitive, the lack of economic opportunities and sheer poverty of these 
communities prevent awareness-raising interventions from achieving their full potential.  
  
3.4 Joint Interventions 
 
Education/scholarships, skills/vocational training, and shelters  
Education and scholarship initiatives, subsidized skills or vocational training, and 
shelters are all initiatives undertaken by both government agencies and NGOs/IGOs and each 
has the potential to be, and occasionally is, very effective. In communities where “educational 
options are few and costly, scholarships are sorely needed if children are to continue their 
education” (Embassy Antananarivo 2007, 07ANTANANARIVO161). The same can be said about 
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apprenticeships and skills- training. From my own experience working at Aajeevika Bureau’s 
STEP Academy and tracking down past trainees for an impact assessment of training, I can 
attest that these young migrants greatly benefitted from their low-cost training and for the 
most part have experienced significant increases in job opportunities and salary.  
Because these initiatives are often tackled by entities at all levels (government, NGO, 
and IGO), there is often a good amount of inefficiency that comes from lack of communication 
and coordination of resources. Success would require supremely efficient inter-agency 
cooperation so that jurisdictions do not conflict. Also, in low-income countries governments 
might put less resources into initiatives that are already being heavily financed by the 
international community. This is effective until countries begin to rely on foreign aid in certain 
capacities (Embassy Antananarivo 2008, 08ANTANANARIVO164). Because the international and 
NGO community does not have unlimited funding or the political authority to make an 
expansive impact, the issues often remain unresolved.  
Further, children who are approached with these opportunities either pre or post-
migration are often not given the choice between them. For some like Suru and Abhimanyu, 
education is no longer something they wish to pursue, but it might be determined to be in their 
“best interest.” Even if there were a fully-funded, streamlined system for putting “rescued 
children” (like these two might have been) into the care of some sort of program, these 
initiatives typically offer education, not skills-training, and place kids in local schools at 
destination. Suru and Abhimanyu had already decided that they did not want to continue their 
education; they wanted to earn money. It is doubtful that either would have stayed in such a 
program. It is more likely that they would have left and tried to find another job. Ultimately, if 
an intervention does not coincide with the child’s needs or wants, or align with his or her 
personal values, it will fail.  
 
3.5 West knows best - problematic parallels between “save the 
children!” and “development” discourses 
Some of the interventions detailed above, especially raids and repatriation, police 
training, and awareness-raising have been unsuccessful in helping independent child migrants 
because they are geared toward victims of child trafficking and child labor and aim to save 
rather than support. This gestures back to the problematic language of victimization and 
general disregard for children’s agency discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and it is an important 
part of the reality of independent child migration today. Even so, there is more to this story. All 
of the other recurring reasons for failure—corruption, the absence of key social services and 
infrastructure, under-funded government agencies and a general lack of financial backing for 
these initiatives—share the same root cause. Poverty, or economic under-development. On the 
side of the national government, poverty inhibits the successful implementation of otherwise 
promising initiatives like rural employment schemes or educational scholarships. On the side of 
the child labor migrant, poverty and the need to earn money for various reasons often 
overrides any awareness-raising efforts, or scholarships that might have been offered, for 
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example. As long as economic insecurity persists at national, community, and household levels, 
child labor migration and its potentially negative outcomes cannot be stopped. 
 It is important to realize that the limitations that poverty creates58 are not naturally-
occurring in the “third world,” just as the wealth of “first world” countries did not organically 
come about. To explain the root of these constraints, I will begin by drawing a parallel between 
child labor migrants and the low-income countries that they are predominantly found in.  In the 
West, a child is considered to be in the process of developing into an adult, just as poor 
countries are often referred to as “developing” countries. The word “developing,” however, is 
problematic when applied to countries because it assumes that these nations will one day 
become “developed” and eventually join the ranks of Norway, Australia, the United States and 
the Netherlands in the top tier59 of the UNDP Human Development Report (Malik 2003). It also 
invokes the dominant, Western psychology of development in which there is a “natural,” linear 
trajectory from infancy to adulthood (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007, 242). In this model of 
development, it would seem that as long as an infant is continuously fed and protected, it 
naturally develops and becomes an adult. When this idea is applied to countries, it belies the 
fact that the “development” of Western countries, especially former colonial powers, was 
anything but natural. Mahatma Gandhi is said to have asked,60 “If it took the whole world of the 
British Empire to "develop" tiny England, how many worlds would it take to develop India?” He 
meant of course that the United Kingdom is rich today because it was historically highly 
extractive--taking much of the natural wealth of its colonies including opium, cotton, spices, 
textiles, tea and more—and that the world’s finite resources cannot support this type of 
parasitic, unsustainable development for countries such as India and Togo the way it did for 
Euro-America (Payne 2005; Beinart and Hughes 2007). Apart from extracting natural resources, 
colonialism also left a legacy of debt (see Figure 5). For example, as African colonies gained 
independence in the 1960s and 1970s61 many were immediately assigned debt in order to 
“repay colonizers for ‘development’ done during the period of colonialism such as the building 
of roads and other infrastructure” (Broverman 2014). In Africa alone, these debts totaled $59 
billion (ibid.) 
The tendency to forget this history of colonialism and the fact that these countries were 
actively made poor has made the vast economic differences between “developing” and 
“developed” countries seem as natural as their cultural differences. Edward Said’s Orientalism 
and the concept of “othering,” posits that the West came to define itself as everything the 
                                                          
58 Here I am referring not just to limitations in addressing child migration, but also in addressing any other 
important issue or “indicator of development” such as life expectancy, literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and 
many others (Malik 2013). 
59 In 2013 Togo was ranked 159th out of 189, in the “Low Human Development” tier and India is ranked 136th out 
of 189, in the “Medium Human Development” tier of UNDP’s Human Development Report, an annual ranking of 
countries based on certain development indicators (Malik 2013). 
60 This quote might be apocryphal, but it is still a powerful idea. 
61 Togo gained independence from France on January 13, 1963 and India from British rule on August 15, 1947. 
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Orient62 was not. 
Fundamentally 
“against all those 
non-European 
peoples and 
cultures,” the West 
established an 
enduring, 
hegemonic 
relationship of 
“flexible positional 
superiority” in 
which it “never 
loses the relative 
upper hand,” no 
matter what kind of 
relationship with 
the Orient it enters (Davidson 2011, 7). This internalized superiority is seen at play, for example, 
in the British response to the practice of sati63 in colonial India. Even though sati “never 
affected more than a tiny proportion of widows, the rite achieved a disproportionate 
prominence in the colonial imagination, becoming an icon for Hindu ‘otherness’” (Major, 4). 
The practice was outlawed in 1829 and, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak famously wrote in the 
essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, this colonial reaction embodied what would become a 
common idiom--“white men saving brown women from brown men,” or more generally, that 
the third world needed the West to save it from itself (Spivak 1988). This particular case was 
seen as establishing a moral basis for imperialism, and the British saw themselves as heroic and 
civilized, having freed these Indian widows from the barbaric, evil traditions of their society 
(ibid.). Because of flexible positional superiority, the irony of Britain’s own oppression of 
women during the same period,64 namely the enslavement of women (and men) from its 
colonies and the denial of women’s right to vote in Britain, was obscured.  
Borne of this self-fulfilling idea of superiority are plenty of other examples of Western 
moral imperatives, such as the crusade against female genital cutting (FGC).65 The human rights 
                                                          
62 Said, living and writing from Palestine and Western educated, was writing specifically about Europe’s 
relationship with the Middle East and Asia, but this idea and the term “Orient” can be applied to relationships 
between most all colonizers and colonized.  
63 Sati is the immolation of recently widowed Hindu woman, typically on her deceased husband’s funeral pyre (Major, 3).   
64 Slavery was not outlawed in Britain until 1833 and women were not given the right to vote until the 1832 Reform Act. 
65 Female genital cutting or Female genital mutilation (FGM), also known as female circumcision, is the partial or 
complete removal of the external female genitals for cultural rather than medical reasons, occurs to varying degrees in 
different countries. Among many groups it is upheld as a cultural/religious practice and merely symbolic rather than a 
method to forcibly restrict female sexuality. Western feminist and human rights arguments that it inhibits the ability of 
women to have orgasms have been largely disproved by studies that show that with the most common types of FGM, 80-
Figure 5                                                                                                                                            
Source: ("G8 Reaches Deal for World's Poor" 2005) 
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discourse surrounding child labor and child trafficking is very similar. To Westerners, sati, FGC, 
child labor and child trafficking seem unambiguously bad and amount to egregious human 
rights abuses, but this “relativist human rights discourse resists cross-cultural engagement” and  
thus the full complexity of these issues is not understood (Lewis 2009, 4). The moral impulse to 
act, save, and solve, even with the best of intentions and the perceived victims’ “best interest” 
at heart, is ultimately a manifestation of the West’s global paternalism and internalized 
superiority. Without complete information, the solutions offered (or rather, imposed) can have 
serious consequences66.  
This lesson67 is constantly retaught and seemingly never learned. The negative effects 
can also be seen in the aftermath of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs)68 and other 
extreme top-down measures (designed by the IMF and World Bank) meant to “save” poor 
countries by assisting their economic development (Broverman 2014). Instead of alleviating 
poverty in countries that had implemented SAPs, cheap imports from forced trade liberalization 
undermined local farmers, agrarian communities collapsed, people flooded urban centers in 
search of alternate employment, the quality of public health and education decreased 
dramatically, social services deteriorated, and income rates per capita remained stagnant or fell 
(Broverman 2014, Joseph 1996). Looking back, almost all economists agree SAPs have increased 
poverty (Broverman 2014). Notably, the government of Malawi was able to “defy its lenders 
and return to subsidizing corn and fertilizer” (ibid.). This reversed many of the negative effects 
of SAPs and the country began exporting food once more (ibid.). Even so, for most countries the 
IMF and the World Bank continue to insist that they prioritize SAP debt repayments69 over 
spending on healthcare, education, and other social programs (ibid.). The details of SAPs and 
the ethics of debt relief are outside the scope of this paper, but the devastating effects such 
top-down policies, especially in sub-Saharan African countries, help point to the need for a 
                                                          
90% of women still can (Catania et al. 2007).  Like the response to sati, the western reaction to FGM is another example 
of “’relativist’ human rights discourse that resists cross-cultural engagement” (Lewis 2009, 4). 
66 In fact, after sati was outlawed, the “fear of religious erosion” and heightened anger at the British colonizers caused an 
increase in the prevalence of sati because it became a symbol of resistance to British imperialism. (Major, 1;8). 
67 That when the West intervenes under misinformation or culturally-specific ideas of morality or development, it often 
make things worse. 
68 SAPs were large loans given to developing countries with many strings attached. The conditions of most SAPs centered 
on required changes to government and economic structures. Recipients were required to reduce government spending 
(on health care, education, etc); privatize most public services (such as education and health care, which began to charge 
user fees); liberalize trade (import more foreign products, clearly a stipulation meant to benefit the West); focus on the 
production of exports rather than local consumption; and eliminate many subsidies on food, fuel, and medicine 
(Broverman 2014).  
69 Despite these difficult tradeoffs, these countries are repaying their debt, but interest payments threaten to keep 
them in a never-ending cycle of poverty. In fact, From 1970-2002 $294 billion were loaned to Africa and $260 
billion were repaid, but that still leaves the difference and another $230 billion in interest accrued and any debt 
imposed on new countries post-colonialism (Broverman 2014). If countries do not make these payments, they not 
only lose credibility should they ever need another loan, but they risk being saddled with trade-related sanctions in 
which donor countries will stop buying their exports (Broverman 2014).  
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prominent shift towards grassroots movements and bottom-up policy initiatives if the 
underlying issues of child migration, such as poverty, are to be effectively addressed.  
In the brief example of Malawi under SAPs, the country was made worse off because 
top-down ideas originating in Geneva were assumed to be superior and imposed from outside, 
echoing a neocolonial dynamic that dismisses local knowledge, like the Malawian government’s 
understanding of its own culture and economic history. Because of this paternalistic and “West 
knows best” attitude toward low-income countries, what the IMF and World Bank failed to 
consider when designing the SAPs is that the people experiencing a particular problem, like 
economic under-development, often know what would need to be done to ameliorate the 
situation, but they may need support to implement these ideas. This is similar to child migrants 
having agency (knowledge of their situation) but being simultaneously vulnerable (needing 
support to mitigate bad outcomes), and disregarding a country’s existing way of negotiating a 
situation and imposing a foreign strategy is analogous to disregarding children’s agency and 
imposing interventions meant to “save” them. Having situated the attempts to “solve” the child 
labor and child trafficking problems of the third world in this larger historical context of 
development, and considering the precedent of outside forces often doing more harm than 
good, it should be clear why there must be a reduction of Western-influenced, top-down policy 
in favor of more localized, grassroots initiatives.  
 
3.6 Bottom-up Grassroots Movements and the Importance of Local 
Knowledge 
 Tani was faced with an ethical problem. As the government representative for the 
Ministry of Affaires Sociales in this particular village, he had been called to the gendarmerie 
where two girls had been apprehended on the Togolese border with Benin. One was 18 years 
old and one was 17. The 2005 law on child trafficking in Togo clearly states that if a child is 
under 18, he or she must be stopped, especially if in the company of an intermediary or 
suspected intermediary who is 18 years or older. Despite this, Tani says he “found himself with a 
problem.” He felt conflicted. He tells me the 17-year-old “had dropped out of school and she 
wasn’t doing anything. Elle doit se debrouiller. Pourquoi l’interdire? – she must get by 
somehow, so why stop her?” He acknowledges that “it is true, she may encounter difficulties 
there [in Benin], but her parents are poor and we have very limited options for children like her. 
The law says to put kids like her into ateliers or shelters, but there are none. If local NGOs have 
sufficient funding, we pay their fees and put them back in school70, but this is not always 
possible.”  
Similarly to the Malawi case, but at a community rather than national level, Tani’s 
indecision in this situation shows just how crucial local knowledge is for creating policy that will 
work on the ground. Tani was not sure what the best thing to do was because he was caught 
                                                          
70 Presumably with a scholarship or kit escolaire. 
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between the law and his own understanding that abiding by the law in this case would not 
make the girl better off. The girl’s family is poor and she has dropped out of school, but she is 
17 years old and likely traveling with a friend. Because there are no viable options for her, the 
decision in her “best interest” might have been to let her go to Benin. Local people are much 
more equipped to make these decisions than international institutions. Tani recognized the 
failure of top-down interventions and understood that limited resources meant that there was 
no structure behind the law, no working institutions to back it up. At this local level people like 
Tani can interpret the context of a child’s specific situation. Local knowledge is thus key for 
creating effective policy that is nuanced enough to address the blurred lines of “thin” agency.  
 Bottom-up grassroots movements and interventions that privilege this local knowledge 
need to be supported, for people and communities living the reality of some phenomenon, 
often know what it would take to address the situation but might not have the means to do so. 
The following intervention examples are not perfect models, but they are a step in the right 
direction because they give a voice to the community and to children themselves: 
1. Village Committees: 
Village committees were set up in Togo in 2000 to function as “social surveillance” and monitor 
children attempting to leave the village (Measures to Combat Trafficking 2006, 90). Children 
“at risk” are identified and suspect departures of children are reported to the local authorities in 
a sort of “early warning system” (80). The committees also facilitate the “reintegration of 
repatriated trafficked children (80). The structure mirrors that of the national government in 
that the head of the whole network of committees is the Interpol chief, at the prefecture level 
the head is the Prefect, and at the local level the leader is the chief of the village. As of 2003, 
150 village committees were in operation on a voluntary basis (90).  
 
This is a model to move towards because it involves the local community and the local police, 
but it is not a true Togolese initiative. The literature on practical interventions in Togo states 
that these committees were actually part of a program “aimed at fighting human trafficking, 
supported by ILO-IPEC and funded by the U.S. Department of Labor” (Measures to Combat 
Trafficking 2006, 90). This explains why the language of Western IGOs is used in describing the 
functions of the committees—“they are at the frontline of the fight against trafficking,” “1,500 
children have been resettled,” “the program aims to increase the capacity building of parents as 
a partial solution to the human trafficking problem” (ibid.). 
 
This language assumes that there is a problem, that the problem is human trafficking, and that 
there is a solution to be worked toward. While this does not leave very much room for the 
existence of independent child migrants and their, at times, very positive experiences, it is 
promising that it is at least involving and supporting the parents and community leaders. This 
program would benefit from some sort of forum where parents, children, and village leaders can 
come together to discuss the issues surrounding each case. It is possible that if this network 
were truly a “home-grown” intervention, there would be less reliance on the language of 
victimization and trafficking and more room to acknowledge independent child migrants (as 
they are locally understood) and their own opinions.  
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2. UNICEF Children’s Congress 
In August 2005 UNICEF implemented a “children’s congress program” in Nigeria. In each state, 
one child (aged 10-17) is chosen by the local government as a representative (Consulate Lagos 
2005, 05LAGOS1361). The congress meets in the capital “for moderated discussions of civil 
rights and the evils of human trafficking” (ibid). Each child representative is then expected to 
return to his or her community and present a report of the congress proceedings. “UNICEF 
claims that the progress and positive effects of the program are significant” (ibid). 
 
In this example one can again see how language such as the “evils of human trafficking” might 
have come from a Western sensationalized understanding of the different types of child 
migration, but it is a promising initiative in that it gives children agency and honors their role as 
meaning-makers in their communities. 
 
3. Grassroots Social Movement 
In her dissertation, Campoamor highlights an organized initiative for change “called MANTHOC 
(The National Movement of Child and Adolescent Workers-Children of Christian Laborers71), a 
grassroots group almost four decades old [that] functions as a vehicle through which working 
children and adolescents, who call themselves NATs (Child and Adolescent Workers) demand 
recognition as social actors” (Campoamor 2012, 210). These children seek legitimacy “by directly 
challenging the orthodox ways that the Peruvian state and transnational development 
institutions, like the United Nations, seek to stigmatize and eradicate child labor” (ibid.).  
 
Campoamor goes on to explain that MANTHOC was founded in 1976 by a man named Alejandro 
Cussianovich and two European philosophers, and that although a group of working children in 
Lima were also actively involved with its inception and the movement enacted a form of 
communication that “challenged the conceptualization of adult-child relationships as inherently, 
or even necessarily, hierarchical” (Campoamor 2012, 214), Cussianovich is nevertheless “the 
movement’s ideologue” (ibid.). Further, she references how a woman she spoke to at 
MANTHOC’s 30th anniversary conference told her that she “[doesn’t] believe the discourse,” 
saying, “No es protagonismo,” in reference to one of MANTHOC’s key ideological positions, 
“that children are protagonists, leaders and agents” (216). Campoamor reasons that these 
women saw “a disconnect between MANTHOC’s counter-hegemonic aims and its reproduction 
of the modes of subjectivization that dominant disciplinary institutions employ…[suggesting] 
that MANTHOC’s official discourse might overshadow, or even silence, NAT’s varied experiences 
and forms of expression” (ibid.). 
 
Despite these claims that the movement might not truly reflect the voices of the children it 
seeks to empower, MANTHOC does seem to be a true grassroots movement. It capitalizes on 
the local knowledge that work is a reality, and a necessity, in many children’s lives and fights 
against the uniform categorization of children’s work as condemnable child labor, rejecting this 
imposition from transnational forces.   
                                                          
71 Movimiento Nacional de Niños y Adolescentes Trabajadores- Hijos de Obreros Christianos (Campoamor 2012, 
210). 
76 
 
 
Although there are few true examples of initiatives like MANTHOC, theorized and 
executed by local communities or even national governments, that escape the influence of 
international laws and the dominant trafficking and child labor discourse, examples like the first 
two show that interventions are at least increasingly involving both children and their 
communities. Because a lot of the pitfalls in law, government policies, IGO and foreign NGO 
programming come from an incomplete understanding of the local context, true grassroots 
movements against the negative effects of child migration using local knowledge might be the 
most effective.  
But what happens when these grassroots movements need financial support for long-
term success? How would they receive this aid without having to adopt the perhaps 
incongruous agendas of the money-lending bodies? When the national governments cannot 
afford to allocate funds, these initiatives do need the financial support of the international 
community and foreign donors, but with fewer strings attached and fewer ideas imposed. This 
would take incredible humility on part of international actors, humility that goes against a 
history of assumed superiority. There must be a move toward supporting local people in their 
own efforts, rather than trying to save them, just as there should be support for child migrants 
rather than just interventions to protect them.  
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Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research 
The value in supporting local knowledge and grassroots initiatives does not mean that 
there is nothing countries with prevalent child migration can learn or use from outside sources 
or actors. In fact, Western countries and international IGOs, because of their financial 
resources, have the distinct ability to conduct research around the world, comparing the 
phenomenon of child migration and the effects of current initiatives in many different 
countries. Moreover, they have the responsibility to share this information with those who 
could benefit from it, but they should not impose their own ideas about how to best address it. 
Instead, through ethnographic and pro-child research they can add the voices, stories, and 
opinions of the people most affected by child migration to the growing body of knowledge that 
will inform future policy. They can use their relative position in the world as a vehicle for 
relaying the concerns of these individuals or communities to the highest levels of decision-
making power.  
Returning to the driving question of this project, articulated in the introduction, I have 
examined the ways in which the dominant discourse on child trafficking and child labor is 
incongruous with the real economic predicaments of independent child migrants. I have also 
posited ways to rethink normative understandings of childhood and labor in order to allow for 
children’s agency. The last part of the question, “how might we modify policy accordingly in 
order to mitigate the negative consequences of the migration of independent child migrants?” 
proved to be the most difficult.  
I cannot rewrite these laws and even giving suggestions to that end is outside the scope 
of this paper. In fact, it may be that legal instruments such as the CRC, the WFCLC, and the 
Palermo Protocol will always be simplistic and reductionist, and necessarily so, for in order to 
protect children who are in extremely dangerous circumstances at the hands of criminals, the 
laws must hold everyone to the same rigid standards, and leave little room for nuanced 
interpretation. However, in Chapter 1 I pointed out some of the flaws in these prevailing legal 
instruments and in the Chapter 2 migrant profiles showed how they are incongruent with the 
lives of many real individuals.   
These laws have prompted both national governments and the practitioner community 
(NGOs/IGOs) to adopt a particular set of interventions, explored in Chapter 3, many of which 
have their own pitfalls. I examined the current policy interventions at various levels of authority 
and their shortcomings, and with these in mind I now offer the following as ways in which 
policy could at least ameliorate the bad outcomes of youth migration and make their 
experiences more successful: offering educational vouchers for children who migrate to earn 
school fees; hiring child specialists and engaging local people to intervene in raids and 
repatriation where poorly trained law-enforcement might have otherwise had jurisdiction; 
giving children the choice of education and skills-training; building more low-cost skills-training 
institutes like STEP Academy; designing rural employment schemes that offer an income truly 
competitive to that which migrants would have earned at destination; and offering counseling 
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for children at destination--salary mediation, healthcare services, and general support at 
destination like Aajeevika Bureau does for adult migrants—in the place of simply raids. 
Although many of these could be successful with the right support, we do not know where they 
would work best or why.   
The answer, then, to the last part of my multi-part research question is that we do not 
yet have a working strategy for designing policy that considers children’s agency and its 
constraints because these are “themes that until now have been under-researched” (Bluebond-
Lagner and Korbin 2007, 243). Though somewhat unsatisfying, it does not mean that creating 
policy that is inclusive of child migrants is impossible. It means that there is definitely room for 
improvement in existing policy and a great need for further research. Before any culturally-
appropriate, pro-child, sustainable policy recommendations can be made, there is a knowledge 
gap that still needs to be closed. 
In order to create this type of nuanced policy, this future research needs to be more 
than just an increased volume of the type of studies that have been done by IGOs like the IOM, 
UNDP, UNICEF, and ILO-IPEC. That type of research, though it is improving as independent child 
migrants gain more visibility, is marked by charts and numbers instead of names and stories. In 
trying to grasp the big picture, they generalize and create binaries like the title I ironically 
chose—Independent Child Migrants in the Developing World: victims of child labor and child 
trafficking, or autonomous economic actors? The answer to this question is, of course, “both.” 
These migrants are a mix of both and wherever they lie on the spectrum between “victim of 
exploitation” and “autonomous actor,” they need support, not just protection.  
Therefore, the creating of truly effective policy requires further research not just by 
child-rights advocates and IGOs, but by pro-child researchers and academics, who understand 
the importance of the child’s voice and participation in the research. Further, my research was 
limited to the analysis of sending regions. Future research should allow for the exploration of 
sending regions, destinations, and everything in between, encompassing the whole cycle of 
migration. More needs to be understood about how and why children make the decision to 
migrate, the structural factors that affect this decision, and the circumstances that might 
predict good or bad outcomes of migration at destination. More research needs to be done to 
determine which interventions work in which kind of communities and why. Even if these 
answers are uncovered, communities should be approached with options for interventions, not 
templates. Most importantly, the voices of children and their communities must be heard and 
their values respected.  
 These pro-child investigations must be paired with first, ethnography-informed studies 
that value local knowledge, encourage listening, and privilege the participatory rights of all 
human beings rather than imposing Western “best interest” assumptions, and second, by true 
grassroots initiatives and studies not merely informed but conducted by local people in which 
solutions come forth organically from those most affected by the issue at hand instead of the 
historic top-down approach.  Although it might not solve all of the underlying problems of child 
migration, policy borne of research and initiatives like these is more likely to be effective in 
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supporting child migrants and their communities because it would acknowledge complex 
differences in the history, culture, and other important facets of local contexts rather than 
attempting to serve as a template which presumes applicability to any community, region, or 
even country in the developing world. Policy borne of these efforts would instead be the result 
of a productive marriage of public policy and cultural anthropology, policy informed by 
ethnographic studies  
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Proxy Measure of Agency from Study in India (n=18) 
Agency (5-16)- higher 
number = higher agency 
Coding 
Age when left 
 
12-14 = 1                                                                                                
15-17 = 2                                                                                                                                 
18-20 = 3 
Last Grade Completed 
 
No school ever = 1                                                                                  
Grade 1st-5th =2                                                                                                       
Grade 6th-8th = 3                                                                                                          
Grade 9th + = 4 
Whose decision? Parents/other adult = 1                                                                                                              
Combination = 2                                                                                                                       
Migrant himself = 3 
Parents Knew? Yes = 1                                                                                                       
Sort of = 2                                                                                                                            
No = 3 
Intermediary Acquaintance = 1                                                                                                       
Relative = 2                                                                                                                            
Nuclear Family/ Close Friend = 3 
None = 3 
Table 2 
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